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Nigeria is an oil-rich country, and one of the largest oil producers in the world, however, 
its economic and developmental statistics have consistently ranked among the worst in 
the world. This paradox is widely believed to be a result of the natural resource curse.  
 
The natural resource curse is a phenomenon attributed to the inverse relationship between 
economic growth rates and the natural resource abundance of countries, and several 
notions have been put forward as to the mechanism through which the curse arises. These 
notions are generally categorised as either market-based explanations or political 
economy-based explanations. However, market-based explanations rely on assumptions 
that often do not apply in developing countries such as Nigeria. Consequently, the 
literature has come to increasingly focus on political economy explanations, two of the 
most prominent of which are rent seeking, and domestic conflict and political instability.  
 
Therefore, this paper seeks to identify some the drivers of the curse in Nigeria by 
particularly assessing the influence that rent seeking and domestic conflict and political 
instability may have had on Nigeria’s economic experience. Since much of the resource 
curse literature is based on quantitative analysis, this paper aims to extend the literature 
using a qualitative approach, which involves the process tracing of major events in 
Nigeria. This approach is motivated by the fact that qualitative analysis is better suited to 
the task of identifying crucial insights concerning underlying dynamics of a specific 
country. Furthermore, this paper uses the limited access order (LAO) framework to guide 
its analysis. This framework is useful given that it involves the analysis of rent 
distribution as a means of curbing violence. Therefore, overall, this paper focuses on 
deciphering how oil's impact on the nation's economic rent distribution contributes to 
Nigeria's economic performance.  
 
Rent distribution, which largely occurs through patronage and corruption in Nigeria, is 
analysed through two different dimensions: (i) Formal rent distribution, which is 
institutionalised, and which mainly involves examining oil influenced changes to the 
revenue allocation formula and (ii) less formal rent distribution, which primarily involves 
examining discretionary and covert rent distribution in the oil industry.  
 
Based on the analysis, this paper concludes that oil’s impact on rent distribution 
contributes to Nigeria’s substandard growth in two ways; directly and indirectly. 
Regarding the first dimension, the effect is indirect, as oil’s impact on formal rent 
distribution becomes a driver of conflict, which in turn adversely affects the economy’s 
growth performance. However, regarding the second dimension, the effect is more direct, 
because oil’s impact on discretionary rent distribution leads to massive economic waste, 
which contributes to the suboptimal growth of Nigeria’s economy.   
 
Overall, with the lack of good institutions that can limit the power of the federal 
government, and effectively enforce checks and balances in the oil sector, Nigeria’s 
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Nigeria is Africa’s top oil producer, with proven crude oil reserves of over 37 billion 
barrels, and rankings of 12th and 6th among the worlds largest producers and exporters, 
respectively (Energy Information Administration [EIA], 2015). Nigeria’s rate of oil 
production has also increased from a meagre 5 100 barrels per day in 1958 when 
production began, to approximately 2.4 million barrels per day today (Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation, 2015). Furthermore, by 2014, Nigeria’s government’s oil 
revenues were ₦6 793 billion, having hiked over the past three decades from ₦11 billion 
in 1985 to ₦324 billion in 1995 and further to ₦4 762 billion in 2005 (86%) (Central 
Bank of Nigeria, 2015). Thus, the oil sector is extremely significant to the Nigerian 
economy and it dominates in its contribution to exports and government revenues, 
accounting for 95% and 70%, respectively (Corrales et al., 2015).  
 
However, Nigeria’s economic performance and pace of development have been slower 
than expected.  It has continuously had one of the lowest rankings in the world in terms 
of its GPD per capita, which was in fact worse between 1981 and 2004 than it was in 
1970. Furthermore, by 2005, the extent of the nation’s poor economic performance was 
so severe, with an external debt of $36 billion, that it received some international 
assistance through debt relief worth $18 billion (Center for Global Development [CGD], 
n.d). By 2015, GDP growth was 6.3% and GDP per capita was approximately current US 
$3 184.62. However, 62% of the Nigerian population lives below the poverty line of PPP 
US$1.25 per day, and the intensity of the poverty is extreme, indicated by a poverty gap 
of 33.7. Furthermore, by 2012, only 55.6% of the population had access to electricity. 
There is also a major issue of inequality, as is evident from its Gini coefficient of 43 in 
2009, whereby the lowest 20% of income earners represented 5.4% of the total income in 
Nigeria, while the highest 20% accounted for 49% of total income (World Bank [WB], 
2015). Moreover, Nigeria suffers from an unemployment rate of 23.9 %, which is more 
than double Sub-Saharan Africa’s average unemployment rate of 11.9 % (United Nation 
Development Report [United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], 2015). 
Furthermore, the economy has failed to diversify and therefore is extremely dependent on 
! 2!
its oil (Heritage Foundation, 2016). Concerning the human capital of its population, 
health and education statistics are less than optimal.  Life expectancy at birth in the 
country remains low, having increased from 45.6 in 1980 only to 52.8 in 2014, and the 
adult literacy rate was last measured as 51.1% in 2008 (UNDP, 2015). In addition, 
corruption is pervasive, and Nigeria is amongst the most corrupt countries in the world. It 
ranks 39th in the world with a Corruption Perception Index score of 27 (where a score of 0 
means highly corrupt and a score of 100 means “very clean” i.e. not corrupt) which is in 
stark contrast to Denmark’s score of 92 as the least corrupt country in the world. Even 
Nigeria’s judiciary system is not completely independent, as it faces regular political 
interference, and inadequate funding, which make it susceptible to corruption (Heritage 
Foundation, 2016). Overall, the economic performance of Nigeria has left much to be 
desired. Thus, this begs the question as to what has been the cause of its overall 
suboptimal performance.  
 
Sachs and Warner (1995), attribute this paradox, faced by many resource rich-countries, 
to a phenomenon called the resource curse, which is characterised by the suboptimal 
growth rates of resource-rich countries. Thus, the purpose of this paper is to highlight 
some of the underlying factors that have caused the symptoms of the curse in Nigeria. 
 
There have been several notions put forward as to the cause of the inverse relationship 
between natural resource abundance and economic growth rates. Generally, the literature 
on the topic can be divided into two broad categories, one of which provides explanations 
for the inverse relationship that are market-based, while the other provides explanations 
that are political economy-based (Deacon and Rode, 2012). Among the most popular 
notions, which attempt to shed light on the mechanism through which the natural 
resource curse manifests itself, are the Dutch disease, which falls under the market-based 
explanations, as well as rent-seeking, and domestic conflict and political instability, 
which fall under the political economy explanations.  
 
Sachs and Warner’s 1995 publication argues that the resource curse arises through the 
Dutch disease. However, market-based explanations, which typically attribute the curse 
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to some form of crowding out, whereby the natural resource boom redirects economic 
activities in a manner that is counter-productive, have been found to have many 
exceptions and a very limited applicability across all resource rich countries (Deacon and 
Rode, 2012). In particular, the Dutch disease has since been found to have a limited 
applicability in low-income countries. Therefore it is an unlikely driver of Nigeria’s 
experience.  
 
To elaborate, the Dutch disease is characterised by an economically harmful contraction 
of the manufacturing sector. Sachs and Warner’s 1995 publication contends that when a 
nation has an abundance of natural resources, the natural resources sector rather than the 
manufacturing sectors comes to be the dominating focus of tradeables production. 
Consequently, factors of production (capital and labour) that would alternatively be used 
in manufacturing are drawn into the non- tradeables sector, because the demand for non-
tradeable goods, and thus, wages in the non-tradeable sector increase as a result of higher 
incomes from the booming natural resource sector. Hence, the manufacturing sector 
shrinks while the non-tradeable sector expands. The contraction of the manufacturing 
sector also occurs when the excess demand in the non-tradeables sector causes the 
nation’s currency to appreciate against other currencies. The appreciation causes the 
country’s exports to be relatively more expensive for other countries. Thus, the non-
resource tradeables sector, i.e. the manufacturing sector, becomes less competitive in the 
global market and experiences a decline in demand, which shrinks the sector (Usui, 
1997). The manufacturing sector is assumed to have more positive externalities, such as 
learning by doing, than the resource sector, due to its backward and forward linkages to 
the rest of the economy. Thus, a shrinkage in the manufacturing sector is assumed to lead 
to, “a socially inefficient decline in growth” (Sachs and Warner, 1995).  
 
However, the Dutch disease is based on the assumptions of, “full employment, the 
efficient use of production factors, and perfect elasticity of demand for tradeables” which 
are conditions that are not always present in low-income countries (Nkusu, 2004). For 
example, in low-income countries such as Nigeria, there isn’t full employment so the 
country would be, “able to draw from its idle productive capacity to satisfy increased 
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demands for nontradeables” which would cause the Dutch disease to be avoided (Nkusu, 
2004). Hence, the applicability of the Dutch disease in Nigeria and other low-income 
countries is limited. 
Thus, due to the weaknesses of market-based explanations, more and more literature 
came focus on political economy explanations. This is because the latter are better suited 
to explain the varying experiences of resource abundant countries, as they attribute the 
variance in experiences to differences in interactions between resource extraction and 
political systems in different countries (Deacon and Rode, 2012).  
Hence, since the notions of rent-seeking and domestic conflict and political instability are 
more widely applicable than the Dutch disease, especially in low-income countries, this 
paper aims to assess their influence, as possible drivers of the resource curse, in Nigeria’s 
experience. Since much of the literature on this topic has attempted to explain the 
mechanism through which the resource curse manifests itself using quantitative analysis, 
this paper aims to extend the literature using a qualitative approach that involves the 
process tracing of major events in Nigeria. Furthermore, with the aid of the limited access 
order (LAO) framework, which is useful in that it calls for the analysis of rent 
distribution as a means of curbing violence, this paper particularly focuses on deciphering 
how oil’s impact on the nation’s economic rent distribution contributes to Nigeria’s 
economic performance. 
Rent distribution, which largely occurs through patronage and corruption in Nigeria, is 
analysed through two different dimensions: i) formal rent distribution, which is 
institutionalised, and ii) less formal rent distribution, which is more discretionary and 
covert. Analysing formal rent distribution involves examining oil-influenced changes to 
the revenue allocation system, mainly through changes to the revenue allocation formula, 
as well as through some complementary changes to arrangements that affect the 
distribution of revenue. On the other hand, analysing less formal rent distribution 
involves mainly examining oil influenced revenue distribution through more 
discretionary and corrupt measures in the oil sector. 
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Based on the analysis of economic rent distribution across these two dimensions, this 
paper argues that oil’s impact on rent distribution contributes to Nigeria’s suboptimal 
growth in two ways; directly and indirectly. With regard to the first dimension, formal 
rent distribution; this effect is indirect, as oil’s impact on rent distribution becomes a 
driver of conflict, which in turn negatively affects the economy and its growth 
performance. However, with regard to the second dimension, less formal rent 
distribution, the effect is more direct, because oil’s impact on rent distribution, leads to 
massive economic waste, which contributes to the suboptimal growth of Nigeria’s 
economy. 
 
Thus, this paper proceeds as follows: 
 
Section 2 expands on the notions of rent-seeking and domestic conflict and political 
instability in relation to the resource curse. 
Section 3 provides an introduction to the LAO framework. 
Section 4 provides some background knowledge to Nigeria’s current political landscape.  
Section 5 describes the structure and the makeup of the oil sector.  
Section 6 examines, at a national level, how oil has impacted rent distribution, 
specifically with regard to the revenue allocation system, as well as how it has affected 
conflict in relation to these changes. The discussion then progresses to an assessment of 
the economic impact of these changes. 
Section 7 zooms into the industry level and down to the organisational level as the 
discussion moves on to the second dimension of rent distribution; the less formal 
distribution of revenues, via covert patronage and corruption in the oil sector. A 
discussion on the economic consequences of such distribution then follows. 
Section 8 proceeds to conclude that overall, oil’s impact on formal and less formal rent 
distribution has had a detrimental effect on the economy and therefore has contributed to 




2. Resource curse mechanisms 
 
The literature on the natural resource curse is vast and diverse. As previously mentioned, 
apart from the formerly most popular idea that the resource curse arises through the 
Dutch disease, more possible mechanisms arose, among the most prominent of which are 
rent seeking, and domestic conflict and political instability. Thus, an expansion of these 
two notions follows below. 
 
2.1 Rent seeking 
 
Rents are super profits at a level above that which a perfect market would produce, and 
Lane and Tornell (1996) present the issue of the resource curse, in relation to rent-
seeking, in resource-rich economies as a problem of powerful groups being able to 
increase the extraction of transfers from the centre. This causes the economy to have a 
suboptimal growth rate, because when certain groups have the power to obtain fiscal 
transfers, “capital stocks are not truly private” (Lane and Tornell, 1996). Since, taxation 
finances these transfers, an increase in transfers to one group causes an increase in taxes 
for the whole economy, which, “in turn reduces the rate of return, investment and the 
growth rate” (Lane and Tornell, 1996). However, another path that leads from an increase 
in transfers to a decline in economic performance, according to Lane and Tornell (1999), 
is through the reallocation of capital to the informal sector where, though it cannot be 
taxed, it is also less productive. Hence, economic growth also declines. 
 
Considering the fact that many developing countries that are rich in natural resources 
have weak institutions, which allow for the proliferation of powerful groups that strive to 
accumulate the nation’s resource rents through redistributive transfers, it is therefore not 
surprising that many of these countries have poorer economic growth rates.  
 
However, with regard to understanding why these countries’ economic growth rates 
further deteriorate during resource booms, Lane and Tornell (1996) emphasise the 
voracity effect. This effect is, “a more than proportional increase in redistribution in 
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response to an increase in the raw rate of return” (Lane and Tornell, 1996). They 
highlight that resource windfalls typically intensify the redistributive activity in nations 
with three conditions. First, a weak government and weak institutions (e.g. the legal 
system and professional bureaucracy). Second, a prevalence of powerful rent-seeking 
groups (divided according to ethnicity, geographical/regional location or occupation) that 
are competing for rents. Third, an, “elasticity of inter-temporal substitution [that] is high 
enough” (Lane and Tornell, 1996).  
 
To elaborate, the powerful groups referred to are defined as, “coalitions with power to 
extract transfers from the rest of society” (Lane and Tornell, 1996). They can include, 
among others, province-level governments that obtain allocation from the centre, 
powerful unions and industrial conglomerates that solicit protection, and patronage 
networks that acquire bribes from public works (Lane and Tornell, 1996). The 
competition among the groups, which is more severe in the presence of a resource 
windfall, usually appears as state officials lobbying for extra resources and private and 
public enterprises doing the same for bigger allocations. These actions result in public 
subsidies and other forms of transfers, such as public sector loans, construction projects 
and public sector wage increases growing more quickly than the rise in windfall income, 
when “inter-temporal elasticity of substitution is high” (Lane and Tornell, 1996). This, all 
in turn, lowers the effective rate of return on investment and as a consequence aggregate 
economic growth decreases.  
 
Thus, although an increase in the raw rate of return, which is partially determined by the 
level of resource endowment and terms of trade, would be expected to be beneficial, it 
induces two effects; a direct positive effect and indirect negative effect, the magnitudes of 
which determine the overall effect. The direct effect, “increases the profitability of 
investment one to one”, and thus improves the growth rate, while the indirect 
appropriation effect causes each group to scramble to acquire a bigger share of national 
wealth by demanding more transfers (Lane and Tornell, 1996). In most cases, countries 
have multiple powerful groups that do not coordinate themselves, and a weak 
institutional environment that cannot countervail discretionary redistribution. Therefore, 
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most often, the latter effect dominates, through the voracity effect, which hence, creates 
an inverse relationship between the economic growth rate and the raw rate of return 
(Lane and Tornell, 1996). 
 
Hodler (2006) in a slightly different light attributes the resource curse to the extent of the 
fractionalisation of groups engaged in the rent-seeking contest and the spill over effect it 
has on property rights. He puts forward the notion that the curse is related to contestation 
or fighting in rent seeking between rivalling groups, and argues that natural resources 
increase rivalry or fighting activities if there are multiple rival groups. The result is that 
fewer productive activities occur, and property rights become undermined. This, in turn, 
makes productive activities even less appealing, and thus leads to an aggregate reduction 
in production that exceeds the positive income effect of the windfall gains, if the number 
of rival groups is large enough. Hence, Hodler (2006) argues that in highly fractionalised 
countries i.e. countries with numerous rival groups, the curse arises. Moreover, he argues 
that the more fractionalised the country is, the more severe the symptoms of the curse are. 
In contrast, in countries with few rival groups, natural resources do not instigate fighting, 
and therefore, the positive effect prevails. In fact, focusing on ethnic fractionalisation, 
and the difference in economic experiences between the resource rich countries, Nigeria 
and Norway, Hodler’s model predicts, “ intensive fighting, weak property rights and 
lower per capita incomes for a such a fractionalised, oil rich country as Nigeria” (Hodler, 
2006). In contrast, the ethnically homogenous country of Norway does not experience 
increased infighting with a windfall, according to the model, as Norway has, “neither 
class struggles nor other reasons for social fragmentation”(Hodler, 2006). Furthermore, 
based on historical evidence, Hodler (2006) concludes, that the predictions of his model 
are valid in the case of Nigeria and Norway. 
 
Baland and Francois (2000) also explore the issue of rent seeking from a different angle, 
developing a model of rent seeking in which foregone entrepreneurship is the opportunity 
cost of rent seeking. Furthermore, they provide some criteria as to the conditions under 
which resource booms promote rent-seeking activities.  
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Choosing quota licenses as the form of rents to focus on, they argue that, “entrepreneurial 
activity, by creating new and better goods or services, destroys rents accruing to those 
holding licenses restricting trade in already existing goods or services” (Baland and 
Francois, 2000). Furthermore, they explain that, “a rent seeker holding the exclusive right 
to import a particular good under quota experiences a loss if domestic entrepreneurs 
compete to produce the same good” (Baland and Francois, 2000). Thus, unlike many 
other models, which only focus on how rent-seeking can crowd out entrepreneurship, in 
their model, entrepreneurship may also crowd out rent seeking depending on the initial 
makeup of the economy (Baland and Francois, 2000). In essence, the viewpoint of 
Baland and Francois (2000) is that the resource curse does not occur unconditionally, but 
that rather it results when a resource boom occurs in an economy where there is a 
significant amount of rent-seekers already dominating it. In such a case, the boom would 
pull more entrepreneurs out of entrepreneurship into rent seeking, and ultimately cause a 
decline in aggregate income (Baland and Francois, 2000).  
The reason for this lies in the fact that entrepreneurs face a positive marginal cost of 
production. Thus, although both rent-seekers and entrepreneurs benefit from an increase 
in the size of the economy as a result of the boom, the rent seekers are able to capture 
their full benefits, while entrepreneurs can only partially capture the benefits that arise. 
The intuition behind this is that in a sector where a good is sold by rent seekers, whose 
rents derive from holding the right to sell the imported good, the amount sold i.e. the 
quota amount does not change. Therefore, the only response to a higher demand 
stemming from the resource boom is a higher price, which is a benefit that the rent 
seekers, holding import quotas, fully capture because consumers simply pay the higher 
price. On the other hand, entrepreneurs, who compete based on price, cannot increase 
their prices, and therefore react to the increased demand by increasing production. 
However, because producing and selling more units also causes costs to rise, they do not 
capture the full benefits.  In fact, consumers capture some of the benefits as a result of 
increased supply (Baland and Francois, 2000). Thus, since returns to rent-seeking are 
relatively higher compared to the returns to entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs will become 
more inclined to partake in rent-seeking activities. This model is in line with the general 
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notion found in the literature on rent-seeking, that “an increase in rent-seekers thus 
lowers returns to both rent seeking and entrepreneurship, with possibly larger marginal 
effects on production” which lower economic growth (Baland and Francois, 2000).  
 
Baland and Francois (2000) further provide some supporting evidence from the 
experiences of a sample of twelve countries. Although the sample is small, they argue 
that the experiences of Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Trinidad indicate that oil booms led to 
their slower growth through increased rent seeking. Their conclusion is gathered from the 
fact that public consumption in GDP in these countries had increased while the share of 
manufacturing had decreased (Baland and Francois, 2000).  
 
2.2 Domestic conflict and political instability 
 
Another school of thought is that the natural resources curse is caused by natural 
resources’ impact on violent conflict and is motivated by the wide consensus that conflict 
is detrimental to growth and development. The pathway from conflict to the deterioration 
of an economy involves direct costs and indirect costs. These include a rise in the spread 
of diseases and mortality rates, a disruption to education, which can take decades to 
restore, a disruption to productivity, caused by damaged social and physical 
infrastructure, and the shrinkage of opportunities to trade, communication, and therefore 
profitability (Bannon and Collier, 2003). Hence, the investment climate becomes volatile, 
which increases capital flight, and lowers incomes due to the contraction of the 
manufacturing and tourism sectors, among other reasons, all of which hinder the growth 
rate (Bannon and Collier, 2003). 
 
Collier and Hoeffler (1998) posit that war takes place when the difference between the 
gains from a victorious rebellion and the costs of rebellion is sufficiently large. When the 
incentive of a rebellion is to capture the state, then, “their capacity will be dependent 
upon the potential revenue of the government and hence the taxable base” (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 1998). Thus, this is where the natural resource sector comes in as it is part of 
the taxable base, and therefore affects revenues. They find that it is one the variables that 
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have a strong and significant influence on the probability and duration of civil wars.  
If the aim of rebellion is secession, on the other hand, the tax base of the state before 
secession does not determine the potential gains, which are dependent upon victory. 
However, if inhabitants of a region that is well endowed with natural resources, feel that 
their interests are underrepresented by the state, they may be motivated to secede, and 
their endowment may help put them in a well enough position to do so (Collier and 
Hoeffler, 1998). It is important to note, however, that it is common for rebels groups to 
be motivated by either or both of these objectives, meaning both potential gains may 
induce the same rebellion. For example, the civil war in Ethiopia consisted of the 
Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, and the Eritrean Liberation Front. Upon victory, the 
former captured the state, while the latter seceded from the state (Collier and Hoeffler, 
1998).  
 
In Collier and Hoeffler (1998) empirical analysis indicates that up to a certain level of 
resource abundance (a ratio of 0.27 of resource exports to GDP), natural resource 
endowments increase the risk and duration of war. They posit that this is due to the 
attraction of a lucrative resource base owing largely to resource abundance. However, at 
a very high level (a ratio higher than 0.27), natural resources seem to reduce the risk of 
war, which they interpret is due to the heightened financial capacity of the government 
and thus its defence capabilities, which reduce the likelihood of a victorious rebellion 
(Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). Furthermore, examining Africa, as a continent, Collier and 
Hoeffler (1998) find that on average it has a very low income and a resource abundance 
ratio of 0.17. Thus, Africa falls into the range in which natural resources have a negative 
influence, which explains why many African countries exhibit the resource curse.  
 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) however, refute the above findings and argue that 
Collier and Hoeffler’s results are flawed due to their use of a resource exports to GDP 
ratio, as a proxy for resource abundance when the ratio, in truth, measures resource 
dependence, which is endogenous with regards to conflict. Based on the use of a model, 
which instrumented for dependence, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2009) instead argue that 
conflict increases a country’s dependence on the extraction of resources. They explain 
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that this relationship can arise when investments in the non-natural resource sectors, such 
as manufacturing (which only thrives in stable politico-economic conditions), decline due 
to past, current or expected future conflict. In such a country, in response to the conflict, 
the economy’s dependence on the resource sector would rise. This would likely be 
because the resource sector is less sensitive to tensions or violent conflicts that occur in 
the realm of other sectors of the country, since there are few linkages between the 
resource sector and the rest of the economy. 
 
Furthermore, by using a stock variable that captures the discounted value of future 
resource rents, as a proxy for resource abundance, Brunnschweiler and Bulte’s results 
indicate a significant and negative relationship between resource abundance and the 
outbreak of war. They posit that this negative relationship is most likely the outcome of a 
positive income effect, which, possibly through the sale of resources or an increase in 
access to credit (using the resources as collateral), provides governments with the means 
to, “invest or provide certain public goods that raise income” and deter conflict 
(Brunnschweiler and Bulte, 2009). 
2.3 Discussion 
!
However, as mentioned before, over the years, there are several other notions that have 
been put forward as the cause of the inverse relationship between natural resource 
abundance and growth. Although the scope of this paper won’t allow for the analysis of 
all of them in the context of Nigeria, it is noteworthy to mention that debt overhang and 
human capital are two other notions that may have some relevance to the Nigerian 
context as contributors to its economic performance, given that Nigeria once reached an 
economic state so dire that it was awarded debt relief, and it still suffers from low adult 
literacy rates today, which points to low human capital. 
 
To briefly elaborate on the former, in Manzano and Rigobón (2007) it is argued that the 
resource curse is a flawed generalisation about countries that have abundant natural 
resources. Firstly, in contrast to much of the literature spurred by Sachs and Warner’s 
analysis, which groups agriculture, minerals and fuels under one category as the natural 
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resources correlated with lower growth, Manzano and Rigobón find that after dividing 
resource exports into different categories, the supposed resource curse effect is only 
through non-agricultural exports, and mainly through minerals (Manzano and Rigobón, 
2007). Secondly, they attribute the alleged inverse relationship to the issue of high 
indebtedness caused by credit constraints, rather than natural resources, per se (Manzano 
and Rigobón, 2007). 
Their analysis finds that when a credit constraint variable is incorporated into the growth 
model, it appears as strongly significant and causes the non-agricultural resource 
abundance variable to become insignificant (Manzano and Rigobón, 2007). In essence, 
Manzano and Rigobón suggest that the unobserved culprit of resource rich countries’ 
underperformance is linked to credit constraints. This is supported by a pattern which 
emerges from the data, according to which, “many of the countries with strongly negative 
growth and high resource abundance…also showed large increases in their debt-to-GDP 
ratio from 1975-85” (Manzano and Rigobón, 2007). This issue arose because between 
1970 and 1980 commodities, such as oil, copper, coal and iron experienced a boom, 
increasing their prices dramatically, which prompted resource rich countries to use their 
resources as collateral for their investment projects. However, when these commodity 
prices plummeted during the 80s, the decline, “left many high-borrowing commodity-rich 
countries with unsustainable balance-of-payments and debt crises” as they could no 
longer borrow more money with their resources as collateral (Manzano and Rigobón, 
2007). As a result, “devaluations and other contractionary measures” which were taken in 
an attempt to repay the debts and balance the current accounts, led to a slowdown of 
economic growth (Manzano and Rigobón, 2007). This notion is further supported by the 
fact, “that resources were positively associated with growth until the post-war period 
when Latin America, the region hardest hit by the debt crisis, drove a reversal sign” 
(Manzano and Rigobón, 2007). Thus, Manzano and Rigibon conclude that, “credit 
market imperfections- rather than problems associated with the presence of natural 
resources-are reasons for bad performance” (Manzano and Rigobón, 2007). 
Regarding the latter explanation, relating to the level of human capital, Bravo-Ortega and 
Gregorio, “emphasise the interaction between natural resources and human capital and 
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their effects on levels of income and rates of economic growth” (Bravo-Ortega and 
Gregorio, 2007). 
 
Considering the varying experiences of Scandinavian countries versus Latin American 
countries, they draw attention to the fact that, “during the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, both groups of countries enjoyed similar levels of GDP per capita and…both 
were primarily exporters of natural resources” (Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio, 2007). 
However, by 1990, there was a significant divergence in their income levels. They further 
note that it is challenging to explain the faster growth performance of the Scandinavian 
resource rich countries compared to the generally poor performance of the Latin 
American resource rich countries, “without highlighting the educational gap that emerged 
between the two groups of countries over the period 1870-1910, and which remained 
large throughout the 20th century” (Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio, 2007).  
 
Thus, the results of their investigation into the influence of human capital, reveal that, 
“when interactions with human capital are ignored, an increased abundance of natural 
resources reduces the rate of growth but increases income” (Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio, 
2007). However, when an interaction variable between human capital and natural 
resources is added to regression analysis, “for levels of human capital over a very low 
threshold, the rate of growth also increases with the abundance of natural resources” 
(Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio, 2007). That is to say that, “human capital always offsets the 
negative effects of natural resources on economic growth, and this offsetting effect is 
increasing in the level of human capital” (Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio, 2007).  
 
The intuition behind the effect that their model predicts is that the natural resources sector 
draws resources away from other economic sectors, such as the industrial sector, that 
would generate further economic growth through higher spillover effects into the rest of 
the economy and their ability, “to add human capital indefinitely” (Bravo-Ortega and 
Gregorio, 2007). However, the more developed a country becomes, its increased 
accumulation of human capital eliminates this effect.  This is because, as with the 
Scandinavian countries,  “a well educated labour-force…can [assist] in sectoral 
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restructuring as new industries [develop] in the process of natural resource exploitation”, 
as well as increase the country’s capacity, “to create and use innovations that would raise 
the productivity of the natural resources” (Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio, 2007). Hence, the 
negative impact of natural resources can be outweighed by an accumulation of human 
capital that is sufficiently high (Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio, 2007).  
In general, several issues plague the literature both in terms of methods used for 
empirical analysis and assumptions used for models. Thus, there are many theories, and 
many of these theories are contested in some way or form. As touched on before, one of 
the most significant weaknesses relating to the empirical analysis of the resource curse 
has been the widespread use of the ratio of resource exports (agriculture, minerals and 
fuels) to GDP in cross-section analysis. The first issue concerns the statistical issues 
related to cross-section analysis, which comes with the risk of biased results due to 
unobserved country specific variables and endogeneity, (the latter of which, in this case, 
is caused by the use of total GDP, which includes the resource sector) in the ratio 
(Manzano and Rigobón, 2007). The second, is linked to the claim that the ratio is a 
measure of resource abundance; a practice that is common and almost standard in the 
literature. This claim has come to be criticised, as the ratio, is in fact, more of a proxy for 
resource dependence and furthermore, its value can be misleading as some countries, 
such as Singapore, re-export a substantial amount of their raw materials (Lederman and 
Maloney, 2007).  
Nonetheless, regardless of whether this ratio is regarded as a proxy for resource 
abundance or dependence, it has essentially been accepted as a stylised fact that it is 
negatively correlated with growth (Lederman and Maloney, 2007). However, Lederman 
and Maloney (2007), challenge this longstanding assumption by revealing that this 
negative correlation fails to withstand changes in estimation techniques, small changes in 
sample, and different measures of resource abundance. They find that once various 
conditioning variables related to the accumulation of capital (both human and physical), 
terms of trade and macro stability are introduced; the effect of resource abundance on 
growth is changed. What they find instead, in cross section analysis, is that the resource 
exports/gdp ratio is shown to have no impact on growth. In a similar vein, when using 
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panel data analysis, the correlation is completely reversed, as the ratio in fact, appears to 
affect growth positively and significantly. Thus, based on their results they conclude that 
there is no resource curse (Lederman and Maloney, 2007).  
Overall, though the literature is vast and diverse, it is not completely conclusive. Since 
countries differ in many respects, it is seems more reasonable to accept that natural 
resources can have a positive or negative effect, depending on the country. Furthermore, 
for those countries that do seem to experience the resource curse, it is more likely due to 
a combination of reasons, rather than just one, and these combinations are most likely to 
vary across countries.  
 
Finally, concerning the aims of this paper, and the fact that Nigeria seems to be plagued 
by the resource curse, it is precisely the abovementioned weaknesses of empirical 
analysis that provide further justification for the use of a qualitative case study approach. 
Moreover, cross-country empirical analyses generally only offer hypothetical 
explanations for an “average” country. Therefore, insights into the crucial dynamics of 
specific countries are usually left undetermined. Thus, a case study approach for Nigeria 
provides an opportunity to explore the underlying dynamics of the resource curse and 
further refine some stylised facts found in empirical research. 
 
3. Introduction to the LAO framework 
 
This framework stems from an appreciation of the fact that all societies deal with the 
inherent problem of violence as individuals and organisations (groups of individuals 
which share similar objectives), actively utilise or threaten to adopt the use of violence to 
acquire wealth and resources (North et al., 2013). The use of this framework requires 
highlighting that over the course of human history, there have been three social orders 
which are, “ways of organising societies that are self-sustaining and internally consistent” 
that have handled the issue of violence in different ways (North et al., 2007). Hence, the 
problem of creating an incentive that would encourage individuals to refrain from 
violence drives the entire framework (North et al., 2007). 
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The 3 social orders 
The first social order characterised pre-recorded human history and is called the primitive 
social order, which comprised of hunter-gatherer societies. Comparatively, such societies 
were extremely violent (North et al., 2006).  
 
The second social order that arose was the limited access order (LAO), which has 
dominated the past 10 000 years. Limited access order states can also be thought of as 
natural states because this social order seems to be the natural way that societies address 
the issue of violence (North et al., 2007). This social order solves the problem of violence 
by reducing and containing it using, “political manipulation of the economic system to 
generate rents by limiting entry to provide social stability and order” (North et al., 2006). 
 
To elaborate, envision a society composed of numerous small self-organising groups. 
Members of each group trust others within their own group based on personal 
relationships, but distrust members of groups outside their own with which they have no 
such relations. Thus, to avoid continuous violent conflict, leaders of the self-organising 
groups, “agree to divide land, labour, capital and opportunities” among themselves and 
“agree to enforce each leader’s privileged access to their resources” (North et al., 2013). 
This coalition between the leaders is called the dominant coalition (North et al., 2013). 
Within their own groups, each leader then provides limited access to economic and 
political resources and activities in order to generate rents. This usually involves the 
leaders limiting access to trade, education, religion and warfare. However, it also 
involves them limiting access to forms of social organisation, and most importantly, to 
contract enforcement and property rights (North et al., 2007). Access to these is made 
available only to, “individuals and groups with sufficient access to violence that can, if 
they act unilaterally, create disorder” (North et al., 2007). These groups are known as 
elites, each of which is granted exclusive control over specific resources or activities, and 
who thereby enjoy the benefits of special privileges and the associated rents (North et al., 
2006). Hence, the internal structure of the dominant coalition is composed of elites. Since 
violence would reduce these rents, the existence of rents allows credible commitments to 
be made among powerful elite groups within and between each leader’s group to 
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recognise and respect each other’s rights to specific resources/activities (North et al., 
2006). The commitments are deemed credible because the elites have an incentive to 
refrain from the use violence and instead to cooperate and support the dominant coalition 
(North et al., 2007). Thus, each leader manages to enforce the other leaders’ privileged 
access to their agreed upon resources, and peace ensues.  
Finally, a third social order arose during the last 300 years called the open access order 
(OAO). In this social order, competition in the political and the economic spheres, open 
access to organisations in these spheres, and the freedom to form such organisations, as 
well as institutions such as the rule of law, are used to sustain order and peace (North et 
al., 2007).  This is achieved by having the state possess a monopoly over all organisations 
that exhibit a legitimate threat of violence, which thus, reduces the use of violence during 
competition in the political and economic spheres (North et al., 2006). The state also 
provides incentives for political officials to abide by constitutional rules (North et al., 
2007). Consequently, opposing groups are left to compete on the basis of other factors 
such as price, quality or votes for example” (North et al., 2006). 
Unlike in the case of LAOs, the stability of an OAO social order relies on competition as 
opposed to the creation of rents (North et al., 2006). In essence, LAOs, systematically 
create rents and differences between elites and non-elites, which therefore suppress 
sustainable development, while OAOs systematically create competition through entry 
and mobility, which cultivate long-term development (North et al., 2006).  
With regards to growth, LAOs’ economic performance is poorer than OAOs’ essentially 
because economic exchange in LAOs is based on personal relationships. This means that 
recurrent interactions are required for exchange to take place, which therefore limits, “the 
range of exchanges of any one individual” (North et al., 2006). In turn, this limits 
productivity and thus, growth. Furthermore, because the dominant coalition’s survival 
does not depend on non-elites, non-elites are not a credible threat to the state. For this 
reason, non-elites cannot rationally believe that their property rights will be protected 
even if the state makes such a promise. As a result, their investments in physical and 
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human capital are substantially lower than if their property rights were credible, and thus, 
their suboptimal investment places a limit on growth as well (North et al., 2006). The 
differences in growth performances also lie in how rents are created. In LAOs rents are 
created by reducing competition through limits to entry, to organisational forms and 
resources. On the other hand, in OAOs, Schumpeterian rents are created via technological 
and institutional innovations in a cycle of creative destruction (North et al., 2006). The 
cycle of creative destruction refers to the cycle in which entrepreneurs identify new ways 
of creating rents and form organisations to capture those rents (North et al., 2006). 
However, these rents are eroded over time as new firms enter and compete by 
implementing the same innovations. This then drives entrepreneurs to come up with even 
newer innovations, and thus this pushes the markets to more efficient outcomes. 
Essentially, in the long run in an OAO, competition becomes based less on price and 
more on innovative processes and products (North et al., 2006). Economic growth is 
constricted in LAOs by the fact that innovation is a driver of growth, and LAOs do not 
induce innovation. 
 
Much of the policy advice from the World Bank and donor countries to developing 
countries have failed to produce the intended results because development tools based on 
the experiences of developed OAO countries are not appropriate in developing LAO 
countries where the social dynamics are different (North et al., 2007). Moreover, this 
framework acknowledges that there are two problems of development. The first problem 
consists of trying to raise GDP per capita, as an LAO, from approximately $400-$8 000 
while the second problem consists of trying to kick-start the transition from an LAO to an 
OAO and increasing per capita income from roughly $8 000 to $35 000 (North et al., 
2007). Hence, there is often a, “mismatch between the development problems they seek 
to address and the available tools”(Alapiki, 2005). In fact, quite often, the policies are 
actually in conflict with the social logic that preserves order and stability (North et al., 
2007).  
 
An appreciation of the extent of the mismatch is amplified when one considers the fact 
that though almost all developing countries, including Nigeria, are LAOs, even within 
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that category; countries showcase immense variations. This is because the LAO social 
order, “is a general strategy for organising society, not a specific set of political, 
economic, or religious institutions” (North et al., 2007). Their forms can range from 
authoritarian regimes to ones which hold elections, and can include failed states, such as 
the Central African Republic, as well as states with long-term stability such as Mexico 
(North et al., 2007). These disparities are due to differences in how they structure 
organisations in their economic, political, military and religious systems that make up 
social orders (North et al., 2006). In fact, LAOs can be roughly subdivided into three 
further categories along a spectrum; fragile, basic and mature LAOs. Progress along the 
spectrum from a fragile to a mature LAO, moves a state from being less developed to 
more developed, however, this advancement is not a guarantee, as it is common for 
LAOs to stagnate or regress in the opposite direction (North et al., 2007).  
 
The LAO spectrum 
In fragile LAOs, “the state can barely sustain itself in the face of internal and external 
violence” (North et al., 2007). In such LAOs, “each faction of the dominant coalition has 
direct access to violence” and the distribution of rents are in line with the level of military 
power of each faction (North et al., 2007). If a misalignment occurs between the 
distribution of rents and the potential of violence of these factions, factions demand more, 
or violence erupts as they battle each other for more.  
 
On the other hand, Basic LAO states are well established with a stable organisational 
structure. However, “the only durable organisation is the state itself, and the elite rights 
and privileges are closely identified with it” (North et al., 2007). They also have a greater 
capability of reducing violent conflicts. This is because, firstly, not every member of the 
elite specialises in violence, though each member does have links to such individuals. 
Secondly, basic LAOs are mainly composed of public law institutions, which structure 
the state’s internal affairs, and its relations with the dominant coalition members. Thirdly, 
basic LAOs’ public institutions may also include those which resolve disputes within the 
dominant coalition and those that support the succession of leaders and elites; both of 
which are processes that could result in violence (North et al., 2007).  
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Lastly, mature LAO governments have durable institutional structures that can usually 
withstand changes in the composition and structure of the dominant coalition, and that 
support a wide range of organisations that are external to the government. However, the 
requirement of these organisations to be sanctioned by the state is the process through 
which the state maintains a limit on competition so that rent creation is sustained. Mature 
LAOs also have a body of public law, “which delineates the state’s offices and functions, 
and the relationship between the two, as well as provides for conflict resolution 
procedures (North et al., 2007). This public law is also, “embodied in a state organisation, 
such as a court or bureaucracy, that is capable of articulating and enforcing the public 
law” (North et al., 2007). Since this essentially provides for elite private organisations to 
punish the government if it violates a commitment, the government can make more 
credible commitments to, “a wider range of policies and institutions” (North et al., 2007). 
 
Overall, the progression along the spectrum from a fragile to a mature LAO involves the 
state and economy experiencing increased levels of specialisation, division of labour, 
exchange, investment and economic growth. The level of an LAO’s capabilities in 
supporting the cooperation of groups of individuals with a common goal, which make up 
complex, sophisticated organisations is crucial to economic growth performance. Hence, 
as these abilities improve along the spectrum, so does economic growth (North et al., 
2006). The progression also involves an increase in resilience against shocks. 
Nevertheless, as LAOs, it is always possible that such states will succumb to violence, 
though such outbreaks become more intermittent as progress is made along the spectrum 
(North et al., 2007).  
Analysing the resource curse through the LAO framework 
Thus, through the lens of this framework, in relation to the resource curse, this paper 
analyses how the resource curse has worked through rent-seeking and domestic conflict 
and political instability in Nigeria’s LAO setting, and how this has resulted in a poorer 
economic growth performance. This analysis essentially involves identifying the 
contending groups in Nigeria’s political landscape and deciphering how the distribution 
of Nigeria’s rents; most importantly oil rents, among their elites, has succeeded or failed 
at maintaining stability in the country, which thereby affects its economic performance.  
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4. Nigeria’s political landscape and its background 
 
From the late colonial years to the postcolonial era, elites in Nigeria have struggled to 
come to an agreement about the distribution of power and rents.  Particularly in the 
postcolonial era, this mainly involved a continuous wrestle for power across three 
dimensions: political, fiscal and territorial (Orji, 2008). This manifested in regular 
alterations being made to the corresponding arrangements; the distribution of government 
offices, the revenue allocation system and the creation of states, respectively (Orji, 2008). 
This struggle was exasperated by the extremely high stakes at hand; namely, the 
opportunity to control the massive oil rents, which would be at the disposal of the ruling 
elites. Thus, to this day a sustainable resolution is yet to be established. 
 
4.1 Introduction to Nigerian elites 
 
To begin to understand Nigeria’s current political landscape, a brief introduction to the 
main elite groups competing in present-day Nigeria’s political arena is warranted. 
According to Dogan and Hidley (1998) elites are, “holders of strategic positions in 
powerful organisations and movements, including dissident ones who are able to affect 
national political outcomes regularly and significantly” (Dogan and Higley, 1998). 
Among these, are political elites, which are of particular importance, for the purpose of 
this paper. Political elites, “participate in or directly influence national political decision-
making” and they are generally, “politicians who have a privileged access to the state” 
(Orji, 2008). However, at times they can also include, “traditional rulers, senior military 
officers, administrators, professionals, academics, and businessmen” (Orji, 2008).  
At the most relevant disaggregated level, the main elite groups in competition in Nigeria 
include five ethno-regional elites. These are the North elites, the Yoruba elites, the Igbo 
elites, the Middle Belt elites and the Niger Delta elites (Orji, 2008).  
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The North elite group arose in the former Northern region of Nigeria and is composed of 
the aristocratic and ruling elites of the Hausa, Fulani, Kanuri and Nupe ethnic groups. 
The foundation of their cohesion is having Islam as a common religion (Orji, 2008). 
The Yoruba elite group inhabits the territory previously known as the Western region and 
it is composed of various and quite distinct sub-ethnic groups such as the Oyo, Ife, Ekiti 
Ondo, Ijeshu and Ketu. Through their access to education during the colonial times, they 
produced most of the educated elite in Nigeria (Orji, 2008).  
The Igbo elite formed out of the majority ethnic group, the Igbo, in the Eastern region. 
Similar to the Yorubas, they were created out of their exposure to Western education, as 
well as urban migration, and their cohesion was based on their existing kinship solidarity 
(Orji, 2008).  
The Middle Belt Elite was formed out of the mobilisation of minority groups, in the 
North central area of Nigeria, across several ethnic and linguistic lines, in resistance 
against the Muslim Hausa-Fulani’s domination over them (Orji, 2008). 
The Niger Delta elite group arose from six South-South states: Akwa-Ibom, Bayelsa, 
Cross-River, Delta, Edo and Rivers. Although it is composed of multiple ethnicities and 
cultures, its formation was based on the common historical experiences of its members, 
such as their resistance against domination and marginalisation by the colonialists, and 
later the Igbo and Yoruba elites, as well as the postcolonial Nigerian state (Orji, 2008).  
Elite coalitions 
There are times when these different elite groups form coalitions with each other in 
pursuit of a common interest. Furthermore, the alliances that the different elite groups 
form, and the identities their members ascribe to, depend on the issue at hand.  
There are two main alliance formations that have been prominent throughout Nigeria’s 
political history. The first is one which occurs in such a way that a North-South 
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dichotomy arises. This involves an alliance of the North and the Middle Belt elites to 
form a Northern opposition to the Yoruba and Igbo coalition, which make up the 
Southern opposition. This form of identity arises mainly in the arena of the distribution of 
public office (Orji, 2008). 
 
The second alliance formation that also commonly materialises pits the majority ethnic 
elites against the minority ethnic elites. Orgi (2008) prefers to refer to this as a “dominant 
vs. marginal” elite battle, due to the fact the minority elites are usually in the position of 
inferiority in both numerical terms as well as socio-political terms (Orji, 2008). In this 
battle, the dominant elites consist of the North, Yoruba and Igbo elites coming together as 
a front against the marginal elites, which consist of the Middle Belt and the Niger Delta 
elites. This frictional relationship between the dominant and marginalised elites, usually 




Since the military elite held power for most of Nigeria’s history prior to 1999, and many 
of its former members still continue to exert political influence as civilian political elites 
today, some explanation of the politics of this elite group is also warranted.  
 
Military elite formation 
A colonialist, John Glover, initiated the formation of the Nigerian military in 1862 when 
he created the Glover Hausas, Nigeria’s first military entity, composed of eighteen 
northerners, to defend Lagos in the south. Followed by the establishment of two other 
military entities; the Royal Niger Company Constabulary in 1888 and the Oil Rivers 
Irregulars, composed mainly of Igbos in 1891, the collective unit of these three entities 
was termed the West African Frontier in 1914.This unit proceeded to undergo two name 





Military elite composition  
The initial recruitment of the Glover Hausas, which was demographically biased in 
favour of northerners, led to Hausa arising as the command language until the 1950s. 
Hence, this was the inception of the long lasting ethnic imbalance in the military, which 
exists to this day (Dummar, 1989). Furthermore by 1960, the northern elite was 
demanding a 50% representation in the officer corps, to mirror the relative size of its 
region, which was twice that of the two southern regions combined. However, today the 
provisioning of recruitment is such that each state gets an equal quota. Although it is not 
surprising that the proposition of the northern elites in 1960 flared ethnic tension within 
the military, because it would mean that the position of officer would be linked to ethnic 
origins, the latter recruitment formula based on equality of states also fuelled such 
tensions. This is because some ethnic groups are geographically spread across several 
states. Thus, more officers from these ethnic groups are recruited in comparison to other 
ethnic groups that only inhabit one state. In fact, the Northern elite to this day is still the 
dominant elite in the military (Ikpe, 2000).  
 
Military inter-elite factions 
Factions within the military fall into two main dimensions. The first dimension relates to 
rivalry along the lines of northern vs. southern. This stems from the resentment among 
southern elites over the fact that, due to ethnicity-induced patronage, the office of Army 
Chief of Staff has been dominated by Northerners, and rarely ever been filled by a 
Southerner (Ikpe, 2000). The second dimension relates to rivalry based on personalities, 
along the lines of political rent seekers vs. professional army men (Dummar, 1989).  
 
4.2 Development of political tensions 
 
To further understand the politics in Nigeria today, a delineation of the background to 
Nigeria’s current political climate is required. This calls for a discussion on the 
amalgamation of the Nigerian territory, the emergence of the aforementioned elite groups 
due to the organisation of subnational territories within a national context, and the 
subsequent tensions and elite battles during the late colonial and early postcolonial years. 
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The formation of present-day Nigeria was initiated when the British government 
colonised Lagos in 1861, some parts of present-day Nigeria’s southern areas in 1885, and 
some of present-day Nigeria’s northern territories in 1896. This was followed by 
Southern Nigeria and Lagos merging to become one administrative entity in 1906, and 
finally Northern Nigeria and Southern Nigeria merging in 1914 to form a unitary state, 
making up the Nigerian territory of today (Uche and Uche, 2004).  
 
It is important to note that the various areas, which came under British rule and which 
were eventually merged to form the state known as Nigeria today, had and still have 
extreme diversities between them. For instance, it is estimated that there are 
approximately 250 ethnolinguistic groups across the Nigerian territory. Furthermore, 
within the Nigerian territory there exist over 374 ethnic groups that differ quite 
substantially, with regard to their culture, religions, customs and traditional systems of 
social rule. In fact, many of these ethnic groups lived separately both politically and 
geographically before colonisation (“The Nigerian Political…”, 2015).  For example, 
regarding traditional political systems, generally in the Northern areas, power was 
concentrated in the hands an Emir, which was the main authority, who ruled 
autocratically as an absolute monarch. On the other hand, in the Southern areas, power 
was more decentralised, with a constitutional monarchy form of rule in the more western 
southern areas and a democratic form of rule in the more eastern southern areas (“Pre-
colonial traditional…”, 2013). It is also noteworthy, that during this pre-colonial era, the 
elites of the Nigerian territories were, “traditional rulers, princes and chiefs, wealthy long 
distance traders and priests” (Bariledum and Serebe, 2013).  
 
Due to these differences in traditional political systems, when the British colonised these 
territories, the North and South were ruled differently. Because the North had an Emir as 
the main authority, the colonial government ruled via indirect rule, using the Emir to 
carry out administration and governance through the centralised political structures that 
already existed before in the pre-colonial era (Omeje, 2006). However, due to the fact 
that the South, on the other hand, was less centralised and more diffused, the colonial 
authorities governed via direct rule using more authoritarian administrative methods 
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(Amuwo et al., 1998). This form of British governance; ruling the North and South as 
two distinct administrative entities, continued even after the amalgamation took place, 
meaning Nigeria was essentially only a unitary state on paper (Amuwo et al., 1998). 
 
It is also worth noting that the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria to form a 
unitary state, in 1914, was orchestrated not as a result of the desire of local politicians in 
the respective regions, but for the administrative convenience of the colonial powers. 
Since Southern Nigeria, which at that point included Lagos, had greater economic wealth 
than Northern Nigeria, which was essentially funded by British taxpayers as it, “relied 
heavily on grants from the Imperial Government to function” the colonial government 
unified the two territories. This was in order to support Northern Nigeria with the 
surpluses of Southern Nigeria, thereby relieving British taxpayers of their burden (Uche 
and Uche, 2004). 
 
On the whole, although the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria may have 
been reasonably justifiable, economically, for the British, it was not necessarily culturally 
practical, given the diversities mentioned above.                                                  
 
Furthermore, due to the differences in political rule, the interference of the British in the 
North varied from that in the South. This was most glaring in the sphere of religion, as 
missionary activities were prohibited in the North, but not the South. This resulted in the 
North, being left largely uninfluenced by Western culture, remaining predominantly 
Muslim, and unexposed to Western education (Omeje, 2006). However, with no 
restrictions on interference in the South, missionaries spread Christianity across the South 
and many in the South became exposed to western education. Thus, during the colonial 
era, a new elite class started to emerge in the South, which consisted of westernised 
Nigerians who had received western education (Amuwo et al., 1998).  
 
Then, when Southern Nigeria was split along the Niger, in 1939, Nigeria was divided into 
three regions that were administered separately: North, East and West Nigeria. Each of 
these regions was dominated by an ethnic group: the Hausa/Fulani, Igbos and Yoruba, 
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respectively.  Thus, three of the five main contending elite groups in the political arena of 
Nigeria today rose to prominence. These included the North elites, the Igbo elites and the 
Yoruba elites, and they each lived amongst a variety of ethnic minority groups, “that 
lived under perpetual fear and threats of domination by the majority groups” (Omeje, 
2006). Some of these minority groups included the Niger Delta groups, who had become 
split between the East and West regions. Thus, the Niger Delta elite group, which had 
previously emerged due to mobilisation against the colonialists, resurged in its resistance 
against domination by the Igbo and Yoruba elites (Orji, 2008). 
Years later, in 1953, Northern Nigeria representatives opposed a motion for 
independence that was moved by a Southern political leader. Three aspects of the 
situation at the time motivated this opposition. First, more people in Southern Nigeria had 
received Western education than in the North. Second, and as a result of the first, the 
South had a significant representation in the National Legislative Assembly and was 
more advanced politically than their Northern counterparts (Suberu et al, 2000). Third, 
Southern Nigeria was more economically prosperous than Northern Nigeria (Omeje, 
2006). Thus, the Northern representatives opposed the push towards independence out of 
fear that due to their backwardness in the above-mentioned respects as well as their, 
“negligible representation in the bureaucracy” independence at that point would result in 
the South assuming power, to the detriment of the North’s interests. Hence, out of, “fear 
of Southern domination in a self-governing Nigeria” (Omeje, 2006, Amuwo et al., 1998).  
Northerners pushed to delay independence until their position had improved (Anele, 
2013).  
This opposition resulted in a political crisis, as riots took place, and the dissolution of the 
Nigeria state nearly occurred. In essence, the previous decades of separate and detached 
political development between the two parts of the country had formed a deep cleavage 
and lack of understanding between their inhabitants, which led to differences in their 
political viewpoints, mutual disdain and mutual suspicion (Amuwo et al., 1998).  
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Thus, to dissolve the political crisis, the creation of a federal constitution was initiated 
and the following year, the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 was introduced, which 
officially made Nigeria a federation (Amuwo et al., 1998). Federalism describes a, 
“system of government where there is constitutional division of powers between two or 
more levels of government” (Ebienfa and Kumokuo, 2012). Hence, the different regions 
were given the authority to make laws for themselves and deal with matters that were not 
exclusively the responsibility of the legislative branch. This move, which allowed regions 
to have greater autonomy regarding their governance and fiscal management, seemed 
imperative for the stability of the nation (Uche and Uche, 2004). 
 
The Lyttleton constitution also provided the North with the bulk of the seats available in 
the federal legislature by assigning 52% of them to the North (Anele, 2013). This 
assignment was a result of the British repealing the principle of North-South parity used 
in the formula for the allocation of seats in parliament and, in its place applying a 
population weighted principle (Nwozor, 2014).  
 
Also during this period of decolonisation in the 1950s, a ‘Northernisation’ policy started 
being carried out in the North by new Muslim elites who aimed to create a, “United 
North as a powerful political block in the new political entity of Nigeria” (Suleiman, 
2012). These elites set out to do this by, “exploiting religious symbolism and sentiments 
to promote their political interests” and painting Southerners as Christians who should be 
equated to infidels. They thereby encouraged, Muslims, which make up the majority of 
the Northern population, not to associate with such “unbelievers” (Amuwo et al., 1998). 
One of the main features of this policy was the replacement of Southerners holding civil 
service posts in the North, with Northerners that were members or supporters of the 
North’s leading political party, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), which was 
dominated by the Hausa-Fulani. To gain the support of Non-Muslim Northerners, the 
elites also employed the slogan of “One North, One people” (Amuwo et al., 1998). 
However, the Middle Belt Northerners benefitted little from the “Northernisation” policy 
and in fact were discriminated against in the choice of replacements. In most cases, 
replacement positions were given to those from the Upper North region, affiliated with 
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the NPC, as opposed to those in the Lower North region i.e. the Middle Belt, and in fact, 
the highest civil servant positions were given to descendants of previous Emirs (Amuwo 
et al., 1998). Thus, the push towards “Northernisation” was perceived by the Non-
Muslims in the Middle-Belt as the Hausa-Fulani political elites’ disguised mission to 
dominate them and impose Islamic rule over them and eventually the whole of Nigeria 
(Suleiman, 2012). Thus, the Middle Belt elites emerged and they have since fought to 
forge out their own space as legitimate contenders in the political arena. 
Nonetheless, immediately prior to independence, the nationalist movement against the 
colonialists was an alliance between the North (Hausa-Fulani) elite, the Yoruba elite and 
the Igbo elites. However this alliance was fragile and by the time independence was 
gained in 1960, the nationalist movement had dissipated in terms of its unity due to 
tensions over ethnic agendas and loyalties. The push for independence had instead been 
reduced to a loosely  ‘unified front’ of the northern, eastern and western elites, against a 
common enemy, which was the colonial government. However, as soon as the British 
were pushed out, this unity disintegrated as each leading nationalist, from the regions’ 
respective political parties (formed along ethnic lines), wanted to achieve power using the 
people of his ethnicity as a power base (Bariledum and Serebe, 2013). 
This fallout among the ethno regional factions at independence also points to the 
categorisation of the political elites at that time as being “fundamentally disunited” 
(Dogan and Higley, 1998). This is a term that describes a variant of political elite groups 
in which distrust is rife between subgroups (i.e. the North, West and East elites), and the 
goal of gaining political power is viewed as a winner takes all game (Dogan and Higley, 
1998). This leads to discord over the value of political institutions, and engagement in 
unfettered and regularly violent struggles for political power (Dogan and Higley, 1998). 
This is indeed descriptive of Nigeria’s political history, which has been bedevilled by 
regular bouts of conflict in the form of coups and a civil war, especially under military 
rule. 
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Ultimately, due to the North’s majority representation in the legislature and the delayed 
independence date, which gave the North some time to build up an educated class, the 
North was put in a prime position to successfully snag political power at independence in 
1960, which it did.  
However, at independence in 1960, the North’s power was not as head of state, but 
through its majority representation in the federal parliament. This was the case because at 
independence, none of the political parties in the race for the presidency had succeeded in 
winning majority votes. These parties included the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) of 
the North, the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroon (NCNC) of the East, and 
the Actin Group (AG) of the West. Thus, a coalition government was formed out of the 
joining of NCNC and NPC members, with Nnamdi Azikiwe  (Igbo) as the Governor-
General and Abubaka Tafawa Balewa (Hausa) as Prime Minister. This government ruled 
until the first republic began in 1963, upon the election of Nnamdi Azikiwe as president, 
and Balewa, as prime minister, just as before (“Political history of…”, n.d.).  
During this first republic, friction between Azikwe and Balewa mounted. This was 
because, despite a southerner being president, the northern-dominated federal 
government had the power to focus on issues of the North, and neglect the needs of the 
South. Hence, in this sense, the North continued to hold power from the date of 
independence (“The Nigerian political…”, 2015).  
Moreover, after the first republic the North held onto power as head of state and ruled via 
military autocrats and democrats until 1999 except for the periods between January-July 
1966; 1976-1979, and August-November 1993 (Nwozor, 2014). In other words, the 
Northern elite replaced the withdrawing British colonialists as the dominant elites and 
ruled for 40 out of Nigeria’s 53 years as an independent state (Nwozor, 2014).  
Thus, as the culmination of all the issues and resultant tensions discussed above, 
Nigeria’s post independence political history has been marred by interethnic rivalry and a 
vicious cycle of instability (Omeje, 2006). 
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5. The Oil Sector                                                                              
 
5.1 Industry Structure    
 
In terms of the structure of the industry, it can be divided into three broad sectors; the 
upstream, downstream and services sector. The upstream sector is highly significant in 
that it contributes over 90% to Nigeria’s exports and approximately 70% of the Federal 
government’s revenues. Activities that fall into this sector include the exploration and 
production of crude oil and gas, and income made by companies taking part in these 
activities is subject to Petroleum Profits Tax. The downstream sector is mainly 
characterised by the refining of crude oil and the distribution and marketing of petroleum 
products. The oil services sector is made of services that support the activities of the other 
sectors. Some of these include exploration and production support services, drilling 
services, refinery maintenance, banking services and even catering services, among 
others (KPMG, 2014). 
 
Governing bodies 
There are essentially three main public bodies that govern the oil sector in Nigeria. These 
include the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), which is the main 
government actor in this sector, the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, (formerly known as 
the Ministry of Energy) and the Department of Petroleum (Gillies, 2009).   
 
The Federal Government of Nigeria participates in the industry via NNPC, which is a 
statutory corporation. NNPC’s chief role is that of manager and regulator of the sector, 
via its subsidiary, the National Petroleum Investment Management Services, while its 
secondary role is that of one of the most important oil companies in this sector, with 
responsibilities in the upstream and downstream sectors (KPMG, 2014). These secondary 
responsibilities involve NNPC being an operator and service provider in the upstream and 
downstream sectors, as well as being a buyer and seller of crude oil and refined 
petroleum products (Thurber et al., 2010).  
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The Ministry of Petroleum Resources handles policy formulation, and manages all the 
sectors including the upstream, downstream and oil services sector, by directing agencies 
in their exploration and production activities (KPMG, 2014).  
 
The role of the Department of Petroleum Resources is to ensure compliance with the 
rules that pertain to the award of oil licenses to companies that are involved in petroleum 
operations (KPMG, 2014).  
 
Thus, the oil sector is essentially run by the heads of NNPC, the president (through his 
position as the minister) and his top advisors, who make up, “the inner circle of oil sector 
decision making” as well as the director of the Department of Petroleum Resources 
(Gillies, 2009).   
 
Operation licences 
There are three types of licenses that permit companies to operate in the upstream sector. 
These include the Oil Exploration License, the Oil Prospecting License and the Oil 
Mining License (Lawal, 2013). An Oil Exploration License permits a company to explore 
for oil, without granting it exclusive access to the area it is permitted to explore. An Oil 
Prospecting License awards the license holder with the exclusive right to explore for oil, 
carry it away and dispose of if the oil is discovered within the licensee’s operating area, 
which cannot exceed 2590 km! (Lawal, 2013). However, the holder of an Oil 
Prospecting License can only carry away and dispose of petroleum that it has discovered 
and won after meeting certain requirements. An Oil Mining License is conferred to a 
holder of an Oil Prospecting License that has fulfilled those conditions, which include a 
daily production rate of 10 000 barrels or more. This Oil Mining License grants exclusive 
rights to the holder to explore for, carry away and dispose of petroleum that it has 







Furthermore, there are several arrangements under which a company can operate in the 
upstream sector. This can be under a Joint Venture, Production Sharing Contract, Service 
Contract or Marginal Field Concession.   
 
In a Joint Venture agreement, which is the standard arrangement between NNPC and 
international oil companies (IOCs), both parties jointly hold the concession, and each 
party’s contribution towards operation costs and allocation of oil produced, matches their 
equity share in the Joint Venture (KPMG, 2014). Six Joint Venture companies account 
for approximately 62% of the oil produced in Nigeria.  These include Mobil, the Shell 
Petroleum Development Company, Chevron, Total E&P (formerly Elf Petroleum), the 
Nigerian Agip Oil Company and Chevron- Pennington (Thurber et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, each of these six has NNPC as the majority shareholder, with a stake in the 
company that generally ranges between 55 and 60 % (Thurber et al., 2010), making it one 
of the most important oil companies in the sector. However, this type of arrangement is 
being phased out due to difficulties that NNPC has in funding its share of costs (KPMG, 
2014).   
 
Under a Production Sharing Contract, NNPC holds the concession rights, and the private 
company (whether an IOC or indigenous company) takes on the role of contractor, by 
operating the oil block on behalf of NNPC and itself (KPMG, 2014). Since this company 
assumes the risk and costs related to the uncertainty of exploration and production 
respectively, if oil is indeed found and produced, this company is first allocated a share of 
the oil that will cover these costs. Then, since it is common for tax and royalties to be 
paid to the government in the form of oil as opposed to cash, their oil value equivalent is 
subtracted from the oil produced. Only thereafter, does the oil get split between NNPC 
and the private company in accordance with the percentages agreed upon in the 
Production Sharing Contract (Sayne et al., 2015).  This type of contract is now the 
“preferred arrangement” for IOCs in both onshore and offshore areas (KPMG, 2014). 
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Under a Service Contract model, the contractor company assumes the risk and performs 
the exploration production activities on behalf of NNPC or the concession holder, either 
of which solely owns the concession. The contractor recovers its costs through revenue 
generated from the sale of the crude oil and is paid for its services periodically according 
to a formula agreed to in the contract. It is noteworthy, that the contractor is not entitled 
to any of the oil produced, but is first to have the option to buy crude from the concession 
holder (KPMG, 2014).  
 
Marginal Field Contracts spurred out of the government’s efforts to improve Nigerian 
Content in the industry, which involved the Federal Government’s introduction of the 
Petroleum (Amendment) Act No.23 as well as the Marginal Field Operations (Fiscal 
Regime) (KPMG, 2014). The former gives the President the power to make IOCs 
concede their marginal fields for reallocation to indigenous concession holders, and the 
latter encourages indigenous companies to bid for these marginal fields. A marginal field 
is, “any field that has reserves booked and reported annually to the DPR and has 
remained unproduced for a period of over 10 years” (KPMG, 2014). A company that 
wins the bid earns the right to negotiate and enter into a Farm-Out Agreement with the 
existing Oil Mining Leaseholder for that piece of land. Only once the terms of the Farm-
Out Agreement are settled does the successful bidder have the right to undertake 
exploration and production activities in that field (Ashurst, 2014). 
 
Government revenue sources 
Concerning government revenues from this sector, the bulk of it is generated from the 
sale of crude oil (Thurber et al., 2010). However, the government also collects its 
revenues from oil companies via royalties, collected through the Department of 
Petroleum Resources and Petroleum Profits Tax, which companies pay to the Federal 
Inland Revenue Service (Gillies, 2009).   
 
With respect to the amount of royalty a company holding a concession is obligated to 
pay, the rate varies depending on the location and depth within which a company 
operates.  The Petroleum Act (1969) stipulates rates shown in the Tables 1 and 2 below.  
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Table 1: Onshore royalty rate 
Source: (Petroleum Act 1969) 
Table 2: Offshore royalty rates for different water depths  
Water Depth (m) Royalty rate (%) 
0 -100 18.5 
101 - 200 16.5 
201 - 500 12.5 
501 – 800   8.0 
801 - 1000   4.0 
Exceeding 1000   0.0 
Source: (Petroleum Act 1969) 
However, the Petroleum Act (1969) as amended in 2003, also stipulates rates specifically 
applicable to Production Sharing Contracts, operating in the onshore and shallow 
offshore. This amendment provides for varying royalty rates depending on the production 
level, with the aim of enticing more companies to form such arrangements as opposed to 
Joint Ventures (KPMG, 2014). 
Drilling location Royalty rate (%) 
On shore 20 
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Table 3: Onshore royalty rates for different production levels 
 
Production (bbl/d) Royalty rate (%) 
Production below 2000  5 
Production between 2 000 and 5 000  7.5 
Production between 5 000 and 10 000  15 
Production exceeding 10 000  20 
 
Source: (Petroleum Act 1969) 
 
 



















Source: (Petroleum Act 1969) 
 
Furthermore, companies in Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing 
Contracts (DOIBPSC) are not subject to the fiscal regime described in the Petroleum Act, 
Production (bbl/d) Royalty rate (%) 
Up to 100m depth  
Production below 5 000  2.5  
Production between 5 000 and 10 000  7.5  
Production between 10000 and 15 000  12.5  
Production exceeding 15 000  18.5 
 Between 100m and 200m depth  
Production below 5 000 1.5 
Production between 5 000 and 10 000 3.0 
Production between 10000 and 15 000 5 
Production between 15000 and 25 000 10 
Production exceeding 25 000 16.67 
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but rather to the one specified in the DOIBPSC Decree (1999), which is shown in Table 5 
below. 
 
Table 5: Deep offshore royalty rates for different water depths 
 
Water Depth (m) Royalty rate (%) 
From 201-500 12 
From 501-800 8 
From 801-1000 4 
Exceeding 1000 0 
 
Source: (Deep Offshore and Inland Basin Production Sharing Contract Decree 1999) 
 
Turning to the Petroleum Profits Tax, under the Petroleum Profits Tax Act, companies in 
Joint Ventures are charged a 65.75% tax rate on their chargeable profit during their first 
five years of operation, while the company is still aiming to fully recover its pre-
production costs. After this period, they face a tax rate of 85%. On the other hand, the 
Petroleum Profits Tax rate for Production Sharing Contract companies operating in the 
deep offshore (over 200 metres) and the inland basin is 50% of chargeable profits from 
the contract area (KPMG, 2014). In a service contract, however, only the holder of the 
concession is subject to the PPTA, while the contractor company is subject to the 
Companies Income Tax Act, which stipulates a tax rate of 30% (KPMG, 2014). 
 
5.2 Main players in the industry 
 
One of the most striking features of the industry is its domination by International Oil 
Companies (IOCs). This domination began in the colonial era as far back as 1908, when 
the Nigerian oil industry was conceived by the entry of the first IOC, the Nigerian 
Bitumen Company, which started exploration activities in the west of Nigeria, and was 
subsequently followed by more IOCS, namely the Mineral Survey Company. After the 
amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Nigerian protectorates, in 1914, the Minerals 
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Oil No.17 was passed that same year, stipulating that only British firms could obtain oil 
exploration licenses in Nigeria, essentially granting them a monopoly over this activity 
(Omeje, 2006). The colonial government then proceeded to grant Shell D’Arcy with sole 
concessionary rights over Nigeria’s entire territory in 1938. However, concessionary 
rights to the exploration and production of oil in Nigeria were eventually opened up to 
other firms in 1951. Due to this, as well as the imminence of Nigeria’s independence, 
more oil companies entered and became players in these oil activities, including Mobil, 
Saffrap (known today as Elf) Texaco, Gulf (known today as Chevron), Agip and Esso. 
Furthermore, by the time Shell D’Arcy made the first commercially viable discovery of 
oil in the Niger Delta in 1956, it was functioning as the operator of the Shell-BP 
Petroleum Development Corporation of Nigeria Limited, a joint venture company it had 
formed with British petroleum (BP) (Omeje, 2006). 
 
For a decade after production and exportation commenced in 1958, these IOCs, 
“basically controlled the entire equity, production, export, and marketing of Nigerian oil” 
(Omeje, 2006). In this period Gulf, Mobil and Texaco discovered the first offshore oil 
fields. Also, over this period, during which Nigeria gained independence in 1960, the 
government made no investment and had no equity stake in the sector, and thus 
benefitted solely from rents and royalties, meaning the bulk of oil revenues went to the 
IOCs. In fact, the level of the government’s non-activity extended to its regulation and 
supervision of the industry, as these efforts were, “quite negligible” (Omeje, 2006).   
 
Only in 1971 did the government become active in the oil sector, with the formation of 
the Nigerian National Oil Company (NNOC), which became The Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company (NNPC) in 1977, through which the government would participate 
in the oil sector. As the government was looking to join OPEC, the formation of NNOC, 
was in adherence with an OPEC resolution, which required member countries to have a 
51% equity stake in foreign IOCs in their countries, as well as a more active involvement 
in all aspects of oil operations. However, it was also a consequence of the Nigerian 
Petroleum Decree No.51 of 1969, which, “vested the entire ownership and control of all 
petroleum in Nigeria with the state and/or its agency” (Omeje, 2006). Thus, in line with 
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its intent, the government introduced the Indigenisation of Foreign Enterprises Decree, 
which obliged all IOCs to form operating joint ventures with NNOC in 1973, a rule that 
was later expanded in 1977 to increase government equity participation (Omeje, 2006). 
By 1979, NNPC had a participation interest of approximately 57% in most of Nigeria’s 
oil producing ventures, with an 80% stake, “in the former Shell-BP venture”, thereby 
completely nationalising BP’s share, and leaving Shell with just 20% (Omeje, 2006). 
Thus, the Nigerian government started earning profit revenues as well as rents and 
royalties from the oil sector. Furthermore, NNPC began undertaking a more active role in 
the downstream sector, by becoming involved in the refining and marketing of Nigeria’s 
crude oil.  
Nevertheless, “until 1992 the expatriate companies had a hundred per cent domination of 
the oil exploration and production businesses” (Omeje, 2006). Thereafter, due to 
domestic pressure, the government passed some licensing policies to promote the 
emergence of indigenous exploration and production in the sector.  Thus, eventually, 
NNPC became involved in exploration as well. Initially, NNPC explored mainly with the 
aim of discovering oil for other companies that would produce it. However, in much 
more recent years, NNPC became involved in oil production through its subsidiaries, the 
Nigerian Petroleum Development Company and the National Petroleum Investment 
Management Services (Omeje, 2006).   
However, indigenous companies failed to make a significant mark in the industry, as by 
1996, there were 38 of them, yet Nigeria’s two largest indigenous oil companies, Amni 
International and Consolidated Oil, contributed only 0.7% to Nigeria’s total oil 
production (Frynas, 2000). Furthermore, around that time, only a few of the indigenous 
oil companies were sufficiently equipped and self-financed (Frynas, 2000). Most of the 
rest of them formed joint ventures with foreign companies, in which the latter usually 
owned 40% of the equity, because they had the technical knowledge and financial 
resources that the indigenous companies lacked (Omeje, 2006). Interestingly, the 
emergence of indigenous oil companies increased the penetration of foreign oil 
companies in Nigeria. This was because their emergence provided the opportunity for 
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small foreign companies to enter the market through technical partnerships with the 
indigenous firms. Without their emergence, which presented a new market entry avenue, 
many of the small foreign companies may not have been able to viably enter the Nigerian 
oil exploration and production sectors (Frynas, 2000).  
 
Ultimately, the diversification and indigenisation measures failed to diminish the 
dominance of the six IOCs (Shell, Mobil, Chevron Elf, Agip and Texaco), which 
together, made up for 97% of Nigeria’s oil production (Frynas, 2000). In fact, indigenous 
producers, including NNPC subsidiaries, still only accounted for less than 2% of 
production by 2002 (Frynas, 2000). Since 2002, many Nigerian companies have entered 
the industry, which is a trend that was reinforced and incentivised in 2005 by the 
Nigerian Content Directives, and the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content 
Development Act thereafter (KPMG, 2014). However, Shell continued to remain the 
largest oil producer in Nigeria, still accounting for a significant 50% of Nigeria’s oil 
production by 2006 (Omeje, 2006). 
  
Overall, to this day, IOCs have continued to dominate oil production in Nigeria. The 
extent of this domination is still quite extreme as currently, Nigeria’s top four oil 
producers are all IOCs, which together dominate the market and account for 80% of oil 
production (Stratfor, 2015). However, Shell is no longer the sole the leading producer as 
in 2014 it was caught up to by ExxonMobil.  In fact, the extent of Shell’s domination has 
fallen to 27%; the market share that was matched by ExxonMobil in 2014 as can be seen 










Figure 1: Nigerian production by operator (%) 
 
 
Source: (Stratfor, 2015) 
 
Furthermore, though today some indigenous companies such as Oando, Seplat and Amni 
Petroleum are gaining ground in the industry, indigenous oil companies only make up for 
a mere 6% of the market (Yeboah, 2014). 
 
Even more interesting about the role of IOCs is the fact that the Nigerian government 
appears to have an alliance with these foreign companies. This is indicated by the several 
legislative actions the government has taken that have worked to increase the ease with 
which IOC’s can perform oil activities in oil communities, to the detriment of the locals 
of the communities. These legislative actions, most significant of which are the 
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rights of the community members to receive compensation for accidental oil spills and 
the expropriation of their land for the purpose of oil activities, respectively.    
 
Thus, through the disbursement of policy rents to the IOCs, which have translated into 
economic rents, the overall effect has been a reduction in rents that can be captured by 
the oil producing communities in association with the production of the oil. Instead, the 
oil companies and the state capture the rents through the great profits that oil production 
generates. Hence, these policies have led to the allocation of more oil-related wealth to 
oil companies than to community members.   
 
These actions have been attributed by some academics, to an alliance between the state, 
ruling political elites and the multinational oil companies, which encourages the 
extraction of oil in order for oil wealth to be divided among these stakeholders (Obi, 
2010). However, another set of academics view these legislative actions as primarily 
being driven by the pursuit of rents and the non-productive accumulation on the part of 
the state, which is dominated by, “an unstable coalition of ethnic majority elites who’s 
geographical homelands have little or no oil reserves” (Omeje, 2006). For this latter set of 
academics, the IOCs benefit because their interests happen to coincide in many instances 
with that of the state. This is because, the production of the rents that the state is in 
pursuit of is generated from oil production, which is mainly enacted and coordinated by 
foreign capital i.e. the IOCs. Hence, the IOCs naturally, secure huge profits as capitalist 
investors (Omeje, 2006). In other words, it appears as though, “the state bias in favour of 
oil companies, was ensured by the continuing reliance of the state and the business elite 
on foreign oil and gas investment” (Frynas, 2000). Moreover, “this bias rendered the state 
less receptive to the needs of village communities” (Frynas, 2000).  
 
Nonetheless, the state’s bias towards the oil companies has an ethnic element to it as 
well. This is related to the fact that crude oil has predominantly and almost exclusively 
been located in rural areas on the land of ethnic minority groups in the South East of the 
country. Due to the numerical inferiority of these groups, which include the Ijaw, the 
Ikwerre, the Edo the Itsekiri, among many other small ethnic groups, they struggle to 
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exert political power (Frynas, 2000). In essence, because the dominant coalition’s 
survival is not reliant on these non-elite minority ethnic groups, they are not viewed as 
the threat to the state and therefore have their needs overlooked. 
 
6. The political economy of revenue allocation  
 
As previously mentioned, from the late colonial years to the postcolonial era, elites in 
Nigeria have struggled to come to an agreement about the distribution of power and rents. 
Particularly since the postcolonial era after the production of oil began, a continuous 
wrestle for access to oil rents has ensued. This has regularly manifested in alterations 
being made to the revenue allocation formula and the number of states in Nigeria. 
However, it has also manifested in other measures being taken that affect the access to or 
size of rents, and in turn, affect the distribution of revenues.  
 
Thus, this section argues that with the rise in the dominance of oil in the Nigerian 
economy, alterations to the revenue allocation formula, particularly the aspects of it that 
relate to oil revenues, were undertaken to increase the ruling elites’ access to oil rents. 
This led to the intensification of the “winner take all” fight for political rule among 
dominant elites, which in turn prompted conflicts, and even more tactics being 
undertaken to alter the distribution of revenues, such as the creation of states and other 
methods that affect access to rents and government offices. Overall, this resulted in 
numerous coups and a civil war, all of which contributed to the ultimately sub-optimal 
economic performance of Nigeria. Hence, oil’s impact on formal rent distribution 
indirectly affects the economy through conflict and political instability. 
6.1 Inception of the revenue allocation issue 
Revenue allocation                                                                                                           
The amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria, was the first spark that ignited 
tensions concerning revenue allocation, as it induced the creation of a central account 
through which payments from regional governments’ revenues would be collected, and 
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apportioned back to the regions according to an allocation formula (Nkowedi, 2001). 
Hence, the revenue allocation formula was the first arrangement conceived to deal with 
the distribution of revenues across Nigeria. Since then, revenue allocation has been a 
contentious issue in Nigeria; however, more so since oil started to influence the decisions 
made with regard to how revenue should be shared.  
Due to the fact that Nigeria has adopted a federal system, the issue of revenue allocation 
is especially complex as it involves two components. The first component pertains to how 
revenue is distributed vertically between the federal government and various other tiers of 
government, including state and local governments (Ebienfa and Kumokuo, 2012). The 
second component relates to how revenue is shared horizontally across states and local 
governments, which varies based on several factors/principles (Ebienfa and Kumokuo, 
2012). In Nigeria, the principles that have been considered in different combinations, in 
the sharing of the “national cake” have included: (i) Derivation (ii) Balanced 
development (iii) Basic Needs (iv) Population Derivation (v) Minimum responsibility of 
government, (vi) Equality of states  (vii) Absorptive Capacity (viii) Landmass and 
Terrain (ix) Minimum material standards (x) Equality of access to development 
opportunities  (xi) Social development factor (xii) Independent revenue/Tax effort (xiii) 
Fiscal Efficiency  (xiv) Internal revenue generation effort (Lukpata, 2013).  
Regarding the revenue allocation formula, this paper focuses on the principle of 
derivation in relation to mining rents and royalties, which has undergone the most 
changes with the ascendance of oil as the mainstay of the economy. Applying the 
principle of derivation involves the allocation of revenues based on their region or state 
of origin. For instance, a 100% application of the derivation principle for mining rents 
and royalties would mean that a region or state would receive a 100 % of the revenues 
that it contributed from its mining to the central account.  
6.2 Changes to revenue allocation 
To reiterate, the main changes to revenue allocation in Nigeria occurred through changes 
in the application of the derivation principle to the revenue allocation formula, shown in 
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Table 6 below. 
Table 6: Revenue allocation formula changes 
Sources: (Anyadike and Innocent, 2012); (Nkowedi, 2001); (Uche and Uche, 2004)  
Thus, a discussion on the most significant changes to revenue allocation and the resulting 
episodes of violence follows. 
6.2.1 Changes without oil influence 
Prior to independence, four revenue allocation commissions were set up. The first three 
were in response to constitutional developments, which, starting with the introduction of 
the Richards Constitution in 1946, became more and more influenced by the idea of  
Federalism. These first three revenue allocation commissions included the Phillipson 
commission (1946), Hicks-Phillipson commission (1951), and the Chick commission 
(1953) all of which applied the principle of derivation to mining rents and royalties. 
Hence, states of origin were entitled to 100% of these revenues (Uche and Uche, 2004).  
Year Derivation Principle (%) Commission/committee 
Decree/Act 
1946 100 Phillipson Commission 
1951 100 Hicks-Phillipson Commission 
1953 100 Chick Commission 
1958 50 Raisman Commission 
1964 50 Binns Commission 
1970 45 Decree No.13 of 1970 
1971 45 (of only onshore) Decree No. 9 of 1971 
1975 20 Decree No.6 of 1975 
1979 0 Obasanjo regime 
1982 1.5 Allocation of Revenue Act No.1 of 1982 
1985-1989 1.5 4 different committees 
1992 3 Oil Mineral Producing and Development Commission (OMPADEC) 
1999 - now 13 1999 constitution 
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It is important to note that around this time, agriculture was the mainstay of the economy, 
and, “the politics of revenue sharing [was] limited…because the regions were accorded 
the constitutional right to control the resources they produce” (Ebienfa and Kumokuo, 
2012). In other words, each region was able to prosper from their agricultural resources, 
which was cocoa in the West, groundnut and coconut oil in the North and palm oil in East 
(Anyadike and Innocent, 2012). Tin and bauxite were also exploited in the Northern 
region, and because regions received 100 % of mining rents and royalties based on the 
principle of derivation at that time, only the North benefitted from this (Uche and Uche, 
2004). Nonetheless, the West was the wealthiest of the regions, and though the East had 
the least of both agricultural and natural resources, its regional government took 
advantage of its endowments by raising revenues through various tax measures to meet 
the needs of the region (Ebienfa and Kumokuo, 2012).  
 
Furthermore, at the point of the discovery of oil in the ethnic minority lands of Oloibiri in 
the Niger Delta, in 1956, Chick’s formula was in operation, meaning that the formula for 
revenue allocation was still based on a 100% allocation of mining rents to states of origin.  
6.2.2 Oil-influenced changes and related conflicts          
6.2.2.1 First reduction in state derivation and coups 1&2                            
However, in 1958, with political independence impending, the revenue allocation 
formula was due to go under review for the fourth time, and therefore, a fourth 
commission headed by Jeremy Raisman was set up to replace it. Since this was around 
the time that oil production commenced, the consideration of the potential magnitude of 
revenue yields from oil resulted in a fundamental change to the formula. This change was 
that mining rents and royalties would no longer solely belong to their regions of origin, as 
had formerly always been the case, but instead, would be shared (Uche and Uche, 2004). 
This fundamental change resulted from the Raisman commission’s recommendation that 
a Distributable Pools Account (DPA) should be formed from which, federally collectible 
revenues, which they proposed should begin to include mining rents and royalties, would 
be shared. The distribution formula for these revenues, stipulated by the committee, was 
that 50% should be allocated to regions of origin, 20% to the federal government, and 
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30% to all other regions (Uche and Uche, 2004). Essentially, during the creation of this 
formula, the Raisman commission deemphasised the principle of derivation, and replaced 
it what was viewed as an excellent index of fiscal need; the principle of population, as 
well as the principles of minimum responsibility of government and balanced 
development (Anyadike and Innocent, 2012). 
The adoption of this report and its consequent change, marked the first oil influenced 
alteration to the revenue allocation system.  
 
As revenue allocation based on the principle of derivation was deemphasised, other 
factors came to play a more prominent role in the decision making of how revenues 
would be distributed, and these included, population, balanced development of the 
federation, continuity and minimum responsibility of the government (Uche and Uche, 
2004). Thus, regions began to shift their focus away from revenue generation to revenue 
allocation, which became apparent when most regions began using various techniques, 
such as the inflation of their population statistics, to try and increase the revenues that 
they derived from the DPA (Uche and Uche, 2004). 
 
Subsequently, around the time that a fourth region, called the Mid-Western region was 
formed out of a segment of the Western region, in 1963 (Uche and Uche, 2004) oil had 
come to account for approximately 80% of the total revenues accruing to the federation. 
Furthermore, political tensions were mounting over the change in the application of the 
derivation principle to the formula, which the southern oil-producing states felt should be 
reverted to 100% (Nkowedi, 2001). There was also frustration over the incorporation of 
other principles, such as population and balanced development, into the horizontal 
formula, as they seemed to be simultaneously advantageous for the North and detrimental 
to oil-bearing regions’ allocation of the revenues. This was an issue for the South, based 
on the fact that the North contributed the least to the central fund, while the South 
contributed the most. 
 
However, the validity of the South’s dissent is debatable by virtue of the fact that Nigeria 
is one nation, and furthermore, a more extreme prevalence of poverty existed and still 
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exists in the North, as compared to the South, due to lower education levels. As one 
nation it would seem justifiable for a government to distribute revenues from the oil, 
extracted within its boundary, across states partly on the basis of even development. 
Whether the application of the even development principle was for such genuine reasons 
or not, does not totally negate the fact even development is essential in fostering national 
unity, especially for a newly independent state, which Nigeria was at the time (Nkowedi, 
2001).  
Nonetheless, adding to the agitation of the South, regarding the vertical formula, was the 
accumulation of a disproportionately high amount of the centrally collected revenues at 
the federal level, in the hands of the political powers, which since independence, had 
been dominated by the northerners (Nkowedi, 2001). Thus, by 1965, “a political crisis 
generated between the regions and the ethnic struggle for political ascendancy at the 
centre was at the brink of total disintegration” (Nkowedi, 2001).   
Therefore, the military intervened by carrying out Nigeria’s first coup in January 1966, to 
re-establish order (Nkowedi, 2001). This coup brought General Ironsi (Igbo) into power.  
In May that same year, his administration, in an attempt to consolidate control over the 
entire country, eradicated the federal structure of government, which it perceived to be 
the cause of problems, via Decree No. 34 of 1966, which thereby converted Nigeria into a 
unitary state, (Anyadike and Innocent, 2012). However, this only heightened ethnic 
groups’ fear of domination by other ethnic groups in a unitary state (Nkowedi, 2001). 
Thus, Ironsi was killed in a counter coup two months later in July bringing Gowon 
(Middle Belt Christian) into power, who reverted Nigeria back to a federal state (Uche 
and Uche, 2004). 
6.2.2.2 First round of state creation and civil war 
Also, in 1966, the governor of the Eastern region, Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu, who was 
the custodian of the majority of oil reserves in the Eastern region, threatened to secede. 
His motivation was the growing feeling of injustice expressed by Eastern inhabitants due 
to the derivation principle change and tensions with the federal government, which, even 
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with a Middle Belt head of state, remained dominated by Northerners, However, the 
federal government refused to allow it, considering the economic impact it would have on 
revenues for the rest of the federation (Uche and Uche, 2004).  
 
Therefore, as a strategy to mollify tensions, in 1967, President Gowon, created more state 
and local jurisdictions, a method that proved to be popular among numerous Nigerian 
leaders that followed, which can be seen in Table 7 below.  
 
Table 7: Timeline of state creation 
 
Year 1967 1976 1987 1991 1996 
No. of 
states 
12  19 21 30 36 
Head of 
state 
Gowon Obasanjo Babangida Babangida Abacha 
 
Source: (Frynas, 2000) 
 
This form of power sharing, on the one hand, was used as an attempt to pacify the 
agitated Southern minorities by providing them with a level of autonomy and escape 
from domination by the Southern dominant ethnic groups (Orji, 2008). However, on the 
other hand, it was a means of undermining the strength of opposing coalitions (Thurber et 
al., 2010). 
 
In this first case, by Military Decree No.15, Gowon created twelve states out of the 
existing four regions, three states of which were in the Eastern region. This was 
essentially a way of buying off factions of opposing coalitions, because, once a state or 
ethnic region is divided into more states, each new state is entitled to an equal amount 
from the federal government as a region that has remained intact as one state. Thus, the 
split up region or ethnic group collectively receives more from the federal account, if the 
ethnic group spans across several states (Ebienfa and Kumokuo, 2012).  
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To elaborate, particularly as a tactic to weaken the strength of the Igbo leaders who 
spearheaded the opposing coalition in the Eastern region, the government created two 
new states (Rivers State and South Eastern State) from the main oil producing areas, 
which belonged to minority ethnic groups in the former Eastern region, and made a third, 
landlocked and economically secluded state (East Central state) out of the area that 
belonged to the Igbos (Uche and Uche, 2004).  
 
As a result, the minority ethnic groups received more money from the government. 
However, at the same time, because these proliferated states generally had no economic 
viability, they came to depend wholly on monthly allocations from the federal 
government (Thurber et al., 2010). Furthermore, this state creation round represented a 
weakening of the Igbo elites position among the dominant elites, because the Yoruba 
were assigned three states, and the North were assigned four states, while the Igbo only 
received one (Orji, 2008). 
 
Hence, this initial creation of states and the ones to follow, shown in Table 7 above, in 
effect, led to the strengthening of the centre while the regions that were replaced by 
states, got weaker (Anyadike and Innocent, 2012). Furthermore, the opposing coalition 
was split into less powerful units, and the threat to central power from the dominant 
regional and ethnic political group was weakened (Thurber et al., 2010). 
All in all, this move by Gowon was the last straw for the Igbo leaders, and therefore, 
Ojukwu declared the secession of the Eastern region as the independent Republic of 
Biafra, and the Biafra civil war broke out until 1970 (Uche and Uche, 2004). 
 
6.2.2.3. Further reduction in state derivation and coup 3 
During the war, in 1968, Chief I O Dina led the sixth revenue allocation commission, 
which, motivated by the need to maintain national unity, recommended an expansion of 
the federal government’s role and revenue base. Her commission was also especially 
significant in that it was the first commission to distinguish onshore oil from offshore oil. 
For oil revenues from onshore activities it was recommended that 15% should be 
allocated to the federal government, 10% to the states of derivation, 70% to a States Joint 
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Account (SJA) and 5% to a Special Grants Account (SGA). For offshore operations, the 
recommended allocation was 60% to the federal government, 30% to the SJA and 10% to 
the SGA (Uche and Uche, 2004).   
 
This report, which would have been advantageous for the federal government, was 
rejected in 1969 by the meeting of Commissioners of Finance of the federation. This 
rejection was supposedly only possible because the Commissioners of Finance was 
dominated by civil politicians, due to the absence of former military political seat 
holders, who were aligned with the ruling coalition of the federal government, and who 
were at war (Uche and Uche, 2004). The difference in the decision that may have been 
made between military and civilian politicians possibly would have stemmed from the 
fact that civilian politicians adhere to constitutional rules more closely than their military 
counterparts do, as the latter rule more by force than by general civilian support.  
 
Thus, from 1969 to 1974, the government used an interim allocation arrangement.  
However, in November 1969, the military government achieved a “win”, with regards to 
its control of resources, as the Petroleum Act of 1969 officially vested, “entire ownership 
and control of all petroleum in, under or upon any land in Nigeria in the state” (Ebienfa 
and Kumokuo, 2012).  
After the defeat of Biafra ended the civil war, military officers were free to fill political 
positions (Uche and Uche, 2004). Therefore subsequently, as oil production increased in 
the early 1970s due to exploration and development success (Thurber et al., 2010) the 
most fundamental recommendations of the Dina report were put into effect by the 1971 
Decree Number 9. The decree redirected rents and royalties from offshore oil mines from 
the states to the federal government (Uche and Uche, 2004). Thus, even more rents were 
squeezed from the minority ethnic groups to the benefit of the ruling elites. 
 
Furthermore, when prices increased fourfold between 1973 and 1974 this led to a huge 
influx of revenues to a military government that was ill prepared to manage the funds 
efficiently. As opposed to making productive use of the revenues, taxes were scaled 
down while salaries and wages were scaled up. As a result, the government became 
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heavily dependent on oil, receiving 80% of its revenue from the oil sector, which also 
dominated exports with a share of 95% by 1974 (Thurber et al., 2010). 
 
Although the government was already in a very lucrative position, especially during the 
windfall occurring at the time, the military government’s hunger for more access to oil 
rents seemed insatiable. This was illustrated by its promulgation of the Constitution 
Decree Number 6 in 1975, according to which all revenues shared by the states, apart 
from the proportion of mining rents and royalties assigned to the states of origin (which 
was reduced to 20%) had to be channelled through the DPA. Thus, 80% of mining rents 
and royalties would now be shared through the DPA (Uche and Uche, 2004). Hence, non-
oil producing states gained the most from this arrangement. 
 
Soon after the proclamation of the decree, a third coup took place in 1975 replacing 
President Gowon with another military President, Murtala Mohammed (Hausa). This 
coup is speculated to have taken place due to the general dissent within the lower ranks of 
the military, most likely of Southerners. Their disapproval concerned the level of 
corruption in Gowon’s regime, the perception that his government was “still punishing 
the Igbos” through his excessive changes to the formula, as well as his plans to postpone 
elections that were to occur the following year, which would have prolonged the situation 
(Dummar, 1989). The coup may likely have also been motivated by the desire of the 
Northern Muslim elites to have more direct access to the oil rents at the centre, because 
Gowon’s corruption most likely mainly benefitted his Middle Belt elite group.  
 
Nonetheless, the officers who led the coup chose a “ruling triumvirate” of Murtala 
Muhammed (Hausa) as head of state, Olunsegun Obasanjo (Yoruba) as the de facto vice 
president and T.Y Danjuma (Middle Belt) as Chief of Army Staff (Dummar, 1989). The 
integrative and more accommodative flavour of this decision represented a shift away 
from the winner takes all rivalry, and was arguably chosen based on lessons learnt about 
the tensions that led to the civil war (Orji, 2008). In effect, the new military government 
maintained the allegiance of the North, South and Middle Belt. Hence, it was 
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representative of an LAO in which the elites agree to cooperate in order to preserve rents, 
which would otherwise be reduced by conflict. 
6.2.2.4 The “Islamisation” of Nigeria and a failed coup 
Mohammed’s military administration was the first that intended to pass power on to 
civilians. Therefore, it initiated the drafting of a new constitution for the transition, which 
called for the appointment of a seventh Committee on revenue allocation, which would 
be chaired by Professor Aboyade in 1977 (Uche and Uche, 2004). However, early in 
1976, Mohammed was assassinated in a failed coup. This assassination is believed to 
have been representative of the resistance of the Middle Belt elites and some Southern 
minorities to Mohammed’s alleged plans to implement Sharia law at the federal level. 
Such an act would have been akin to the Islamisation of Nigeria and would have 
solidified the rule of the Muslim elites (Omoruyi, 2001). Put differently, it appeared that 
the ruling triumvirate was being captured by the Muslim elites, which defeated the 
purpose of the triumvirate. This weakened the coalition as internal resistance mounted, 
because access to the nations massive rents would have been further limited to an even 
more exclusive elite group. This clearly would have been too small of a group, excluding 
too many who had sufficient access to violence and who could act unilaterally to create 
disorder; which is why the coup was attempted.  
6.2.2.5 Further reduction in state derivation and more state creation 
However, since the coup failed, Mohammed’s deputy, Obasanjo (Yoruba) became head 
of state, and continued to carry out Mohammed’s plan of transferring power to civilian 
rule (Uche and Uche, 2004). 
Aboyade’s committee recommended that all federally collectible revenues should be paid 
to the federation account, with no exceptions. Furthermore, it was the first commission to 
consider local governments when determining vertical distribution, and the first 
commission that, “urged the abrogation of the principle of derivation” in the horizontal 
allocation of revenue (Nkowedi, 2001). Instead, the commission recommended that 
revenue allocation decision should be based on, “Equality of access to development 
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opportunities, National Minimum Standards for National Integration, Absorptive 
Capacity, Independent Revenue and Tax effort and Fiscal Efficiency” (Uche and Uche, 
2004). This report, however, was rejected by the Constituent Assembly for various 
reasons, amongst which included the fact that the recommended allocation was highly 
skewed to the advantage of the federal government (Nkowedi, 2001). 
 
Nonetheless, in line with Ayobade’s recommendations, Obasanjo’s regime, essentially 
nullified the derivation principle, by ending the long-time practice of proposing a revenue 
allocation formula for every new constitution. Thus, with the promulgation of the new 
1979 constitution, there was no revenue allocation formula (Nkowedi, 2001).  
 
Furthermore, Obasanjo increased the number of states from twelve to nineteen in 1976. 
What is interesting about the creation of states at that point and thereafter is that up until 
the 1960s, the dominant elite groups were opposed to the idea of the creation of states 
because they feared that alterations to geographical boundaries would upset the 
equilibrium among the three dominant elite groups. Their logic was that if the regions 
were divided into smaller states to appease minority agitation, “new elites and parties 
would almost certainly emerge at the national level, since Nigerian politics has tended to 
develop along ethno-regional lines” and in that case, “the domains of the dominant 
groups would shrink seriously in size and importance” (Orji, 2008). However, after the 
first twelve states were created, dominant ethnic groups also began to agitate for more 
states by the 1970s. This is because they realised that by having more states, they would 
be allocated more revenues from the centre. Hence, each ethno-regional elite group 
embarked on campaign missions to increase their states (Orji, 2008).  
 
The result of Obasanjo’s creation of states was that only a meagre seven of the nineteen 
states, existing by the end of the process, belonged to ethnic minorities, whereas six out 
twelve of the states created in 1967 belonged to ethnic minorities. Furthermore, though 
the state creation exercise of 1967 had created six states in the North and six in the South, 
the 1976 exercise assigned ten states to the North and nine to South, abolishing the sense 
of federal equality/geopolitical balance that the former round had created.  
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These results were partly caused by the recognition of state creation as a form of, 
“devolution of central revenues” and the government’s subsequent commitment to 
making states, “as equal in population as possible…to ensure some per capita equity in 
the access of territorial communities to federal revenues” (Ojo and Adebayo, 2008). This 
commitment consequently allowed many requests for states to be rejected for no other 
reason other than a, “relatively limited population, which did not justify any 
reorganisation” (Ojo and Adebayo, 2008).  Thus, in effect, numerically inferior ethnic 
groups were disadvantaged.  
 
To clarify, conducive to the setting of an LAO, the use of population was essentially the 
ruling coalition’s way of limiting rent distribution and preserving a sizable amount of 
rents for the elites of the majority ethnic groups, whose positions were threatened by state 
creation in the first place. On the whole, the creation of states morphed into another 
scheme for the, “dissemination of central revenue derived mainly from the southern 
ethnic minority communities to predominantly ethnic majority populations” (Ojo and 
Adebayo, 2008).  
 
6.2.2.6 Dwindling oil rents, monopolisation of the Presidency, and coup 4 
With the shift to civilian rule upon the election of President Shehu Shagari (Fulani), in 
1979, and a further jump in oil prices that year, corruption became rampant, as regulatory 
bodies struggled to implement and enforce checks and balances (Thurber et al., 2010). 
 
Then, in 1980, a new revenue allocation committee, which was the first in a presidential 
system, was set up with Dr. Pius Okigbo as its head. It produced a report that was similar 
to Aboyade’s Report in its recognition and inclusion of local governments (Uche and 
Uche, 2004).  However, its weakness was that it, “significantly raised the revenue of 
some states at the expense of others and, therefore, it negated the idea of balanced 
development in the country” (Anyadike and Innocent, 2012). Furthermore, the vertical 
allocation was such that the federal government would receive 58.5%, the state 
governments 31.5% and the local governments 10%.  
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The report was criticised, and the government faced some opposition regarding its 
adoption in 1981 on the grounds that it would have starved certain states relative to 
others, all while the federal government would have enjoyed a disproportionately large 
portion of the revenues (Amuwo et al., 1998). However, it was eventually adopted in 
1982 through the promulgation of the Allocation of Revenue (Federation Account) Act 
number 1 of 1982. Thus, for the first time, local governments’ allocation was put into 
effect (Uche and Uche, 2004). 
Not long after the promulgation of the 1982 Act and the re-election of Shagari, the 
military succeeded in carrying out the country’s fourth coup in 1983. This coup’s most 
immediate trigger was the alleged fraudulent re-election of Shagari. However, its 
motivation was fuelled by the overall resentment towards the regime by the masses as a 
result of the dire economic state of the country, which was the culmination of corruption, 
a recession caused by declining oil prices, and endemic ethnic rivalry (Thurber et al., 
2010). The result of the coup was Mohammadu Buhari (Fulani) becoming head of state. 
 
6.2.2.7 Professionalism of the military leader and coup 5 
However, Buhari’s rule ended in 1985 with Nigeria’s fifth coup, which brought General 
Ibrahim Babangida (Non-Hausa/Fulani Muslim Northerner) into power. Reasons for this 
coup were purportedly the result of personality-based opposition within the army. Buhari 
was a strict Muslim, and his attempts to apply Sharia law at the federal level led to the 
interpretation that his regime was another solely Northerner accommodating regime. 
Furthermore, his stern economic austerity measures, taken to strengthen the economy, 
also conflicted with the interests of rent-seeking elites in the military who found him too 
strict for their liking, as he restricted their access to oil rents as well. His overthrowing, 
represented the erosion of professionalism in the army and it appeared that, “officers that 
operated along the traditional military ethos were no longer welcome in the halls of 




6.2.2.8 More state creation, monopolisation of the head of state office, and 
crisis 
After Babangida was brought into power, the arbitrary reviewing of revenue allocation 
formula continued, occurring four times in the period of 1985-1989 (Anyadike and 
Innocent, 2012). He furthermore, deposed all officers whom he believed were not loyal to 
him, or who were too professional for his liking, in order to entrench a system of 
patronage with loyal supporters (Ikpe, 2000).  
Babangida also continued the practice of states’ creation, which continued to be agitated 
for after 1976. Some of the main agitators had been Igbos, who were of the opinion that 
the Igbos were at, “a huge disadvantage in the competition for socioeconomic and 
political opportunities in the federation” (Suberu, 1991). Their view stemmed from the 
fact that the Igbos only controlled two of the nineteen existing states, which was low 
compared to the approximate five states each that the Hausa-Fulanis and Yorubas had. 
Thus, they argued that until a relatively equal balance was reached among the three 
dominant ethnic groups, instability in the country would persist (Suberu, 1991). In 
response, given the opportunity to popularise his rule, Babangida addressed the demands 
by creating more states. His first round of state creation involved the establishment of 
two more states in 1987, one in the North and one in the South. However, since this did 
not succeed in quelling the agitations for even more states, he proceeded to create nine 
more in 1991 to bring the total states in Nigeria to thirty (Ojo and Adebayo, 2008). This 
second round included two more Igbo states and the establishment of the capital of a third 
state, Delta state (carved from the former Midwestern region) in the state’s Igbo 
dominated city, Asaba. The other six states catered to subgroups of Hausa/Fulani and 
Yoruba groups. However, Babangida’s second round of state creation also failed to foster 
national integration as it overlooked the desires of minorities and exacerbated the 
geopolitical imbalance between the North and South by allocating five of the nine new 
states to the North so that ultimately Nigeria’s 30-state structure consisted of sixteen 
states in the North ad fourteen in the South (Ojo and Adebayo, 2008). As a consequence, 
“ the exercise was greeted with violence, rampages and public demonstrations 
unsurpassed in the history of state creation in Nigeria” (Alapiki, 2005). For example in 
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the North-western zone, the rejection of the Zamfara people’s request for their own state 
led to protests which were heightened by the fact that their neighbours, the Kebbi people, 
were allocated a state without having lobbied for one. Similarly, in Rivers state, in South-
South Nigeria, demonstrators marched carrying placards protesting against the non-
creation of an Abayelsa state that they had requested. They declared that its non-creation 
was, “an indication of the marginalisation and lack of sensitivity of the Federal 
government to the plight of the oil producing areas of Rivers State, whose vegetation 
ha[d] been ruined by oil pollution resulting from the exploration activities of oil 
companies” (Alapiki, 2005). In general, the groups that did not receive their requested 
new states perceived the rejection to be a result of, “high-level power plays and political 
manipulations of the elites of opposing ethnic groups” (Alapiki, 2005).  Therefore, the 
main players in the decision-making process were targeted, and when they could not be 
identified, some of the federal government’s facilities, property and assets were destroyed 
instead (Alapiki, 2005). 
Babangida’s political actions further prompted another political crisis when, in June of 
1993, he annulled elections, after the release of preliminary results revealed that Chief 
Moshod Abiola (Yoruba) had won (“Nigeria profile…”, 2015). The interpretation of this 
annulment was that it was a clear display of the, “North’s perception of presidential 
birthright and intolerance towards other ethnic groups’ aspirations to Nigerian 
leadership” (Nwozor, 2014). The uproar over this led to Babangida resigning as president 
and handing over of power to Ernest Shonekan (Yoruba) whom he appointed as an 
interim president. However, this civilian regime lasted for only two months, before 
Shonekan was overthrown in a 6th military coup, and replaced by General Sani Abacha 
(Non-Hausa/Fulani Muslim Northerner) in 1994. 
It is important to note that since Babangida’s annulment of the 1993 elections, state 
creation, alone, no longer worked to placate the perceived marginalisation and 
domination complaints of non-ruling elites (Amuwo et al., 1998). Therefore, an implicit 
agreement among elites arose whereby the offices of the President, Vice president, Senate 
President and Speaker of the House of Representatives would be rotated among six 
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geopolitical zones (North-West, North-Central, North-East, South-East, South-South, 
South-West) (Amuwo et al., 1998, Nwozor, 2014). In fact this, “new zoning remedy” 
became part of the standard agenda of socio-political reformers at the 1994 constitution 
conference (Amuwo et al., 1998).  
 
6.2.2.9 Permanent return to civil rule and relative peace 
The return to military rule lasted until 1999, when power was transferred to President 
Obasanjo, this time as a civilian ruler. An oil-bearing state achievement that was made 
during this time, small, as it may be perceived, was an increase in the derivation principle 
to 13% as a result of the increasing agitation from the Niger Delta. This concession on 
the part of the federal government was agreed upon during the 1995 Constitutional 
Conference in preparation for civilian rule, enshrined in the 1999 constitution and put 
into effect in 2000 (Anyadike and Innocent, 2012).  
 
Overall, since the return to civilian rule, more reviews of the revenue allocation formula 
have taken place. However, none have altered the derivation principle, which has 
remained at 13%. Furthermore, no more states have been created, an agreement among 
elites according to which the high offices in government are to be rotated between 
geopolitical zones has been made, and no more coups, nor civil wars have occurred. 
 
Nonetheless, the alterations to revenue distribution made prior to 1999 have had a 
significant and negative impact on the economy. As oil’s share of total national revenue 
grew from an average below 25% in the 1960s to an average, thereafter, of more than 
70% (Omeje, 2006), the government’s corresponding de-emphasis of the derivation 
principle, in conjunction with other changes and ethnic tensions, led to a series of violent 
and political conflict in the form of a civil war and various coups, as elites struggled for 
access to oil rents at the centre.                                                                                          
This political instability caused by conflict has had a negative effect on the economy.  
One of the major economic losses for Nigeria came from the disruption of oil production 
during the civil war, and to a lesser extent the coups d’états. In fact, according to the 
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World Bank development indicators, from the year that the first coup occurred, 
throughout most of the war, Nigeria’s GDP growth rate was negative.  It decreased from 
a growth rate of 4.88% in 1965 to -4.25% in 1966 when the first coup took place, worse 
still to 15.74% in 1967 when the civil war began, and to -1.25% in 1968 (WB, 2015).  
The political instability has also contributed to depressing Nigeria’s growth rate because 
political instability increases uncertainty in an economy with regards to policies, which is 
a deterrent for some foreign investors as well as a push factor for some local investors, 
who then opt to invest internationally.  
Furthermore, the productivity of states reduced, as a shift in their focus occurred, which 
resulted in them being less focused on generating revenue and more preoccupied with 
trying to accumulate more revenues. This was made apparent by some of the tactics that 
some states employed, such as inflating their population statistics in order to be allocated 
more from the federal government (Uche and Uche, 2004).  
Thus, all in all, the oil-influenced changes to formal rent distribution have indirectly 
contributed to Nigeria’s sub-optimal growth rate through the conflicts they were a driver 
of. 
7. Patronage and corruption in the oil sector
Though a substantial amount of rents is distributed formally across the country, through 
means discussed in the previous section, that distribution, being public knowledge, is 
usually bound by some constitutional rules or at least by the desire of the ruling elite to 
attain some legitimacy in the view of the masses. Thus, for rent seekers, who have the 
insatiable desire to maximise their accumulation of rents, and for the ruling elite who aim 
to dispense rents to garner support and maintain stability, the covert system of patronage 
and corruption is another viable avenue through which revenues can be distributed, 
especially given the weak institutional environment in Nigeria. Thus, this section will 
analyse the less formal distribution of rents through covert patronage and corruption. 
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In Nigeria, this type of patronage takes place at different levels of society. In fact, even 
the executive branch of the government has a legacy of amassing huge amounts of rents 
through fraudulent measures. Two heads of state that are most notorious for having 
abused their positions to carry out such activities are Babangida and Abacha, who each 
stole billions of dollars while in office. Out of the $120 billion that is estimated to have 
been looted from the treasury by various presidents, at least $20 billion is purported to be 
traceable to Babangida. Furthermore, $12.4 billion of what is linked to Babangida is 
alleged to have come from some of the billions of dollars of the revenues from the Gulf 
War-induced oil windfall in 1991, that were not deposited into the federation account 
(Ezeamalu, 2013b). Regarding Abacha’s corruption, he allegedly embezzled billions of 
dollars from the Central Bank of Nigeria, which he diverted to personal foreign accounts; 
usually acquiring the funds under the guise that they were required for national security 
reasons (“How Abacha and…”, 2014). 
 
Outside the executive office, patronage also takes places at the federal level in other 
forms. For example, patronage is commonly extended through the appointment of certain 
state-level government officials as a way for the ruling coalition to garner support in that 
region.  Similarly, at the state-level, patronage can take the form of the strategic 
appointment of administrators in local governments. However, it can also manifest itself 
in the delivery of certain developmental projects to local governments that support the 
same political party as the state’s governor (Ibekwe, 2014).  
 
However, since the oil sector has grown to be the sphere in which the most significant 
dispensation of patronage and corruption occurs, this section particularly focuses on these 
activities in the oil sector at the organisational level. Furthermore, it demonstrates that 
oil’s impact on the distribution of rents via covert patronage and corruption at this level 





7.1 The oil sector as a source of rents and its channels of patronage and 
corruption  
 
Due to the rise in oil’s importance to Nigeria’s economy, in 1971, the government started 
to acquire significant equity stakes in IOCs, all of which had previously been owned 
wholly by their international parent companies. This move was compounded by the 
creation of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) in 1971, which was 
specifically to increase the government’s control in the sector (Lawal, 2013).  
 
Today, state interference in most sectors of the economy has declined over time, which is 
a trend across the world. However, an opposite trend is apparent in Nigeria’s oil sector, 
and in the resource sectors of many other hydrocarbon-rich countries, which use their 
nationally owned companies (NOCs) to maintain substantial control over their resource 
sectors, just as Nigeria’s NOC, the NNPC does to this day (Thurber et al., 2010).  
 
Given that underlying Nigerian politics is a continuous struggle for power and rents 
between the major ethnic groups, and that oil is Nigeria’s biggest and most important 
source of rents, it is no wonder that the state has maintained a significant role in the 
sector from which rents can be distributed, and thus be used in an attempt to keep the 
LAO stable.  
 
As the oil sector represents the ultimate pot of gold for politicians and elites given that it 
contributes the most to government revenues, it naturally incentivises rent seeking. 
Furthermore, as previously mentioned, in the context of Nigeria’s weak institutional 
environment, this makes it a locus of corruption.  Since many of the oil sectors activities, 
apart from the awarding of upstream licenses, fall within the sphere of NNPC’s 
responsibilities, NNPC is at the epicentre of the vested interests of numerous actors in the 
oil industry. Thus, it has come to play a significant role as an, “instrument of patronage” 
(Thurber et al., 2010). Even outside the immediate sphere of these activities, by being one 
of the most powerful and unchecked actors in the industry, NNPC, is a leading distributor 
of patronage. 
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7.1.1 Patronage and corruption at the employment level 
 
Firstly, many of the top positions in the NNPC are filled by, “politically favoured 
individuals” (Thurber et al., 2010). This is made apparent by the fact that NNPC Board 
members are periodically rotated out and replaced, “often on a regional basis in line with 
the regional structure of Nigeria’s patronage network” and that, with every new president, 
the General Managing Director (GMD) of NNPC changes as well (Thurber et al). For 
example, when Obasanjo from the South was elected president, he appointed Jackson 
Gaius Obaseki from the South as NNPC’s GMD. In the same vein, when Umaru Musa 
Yar’udua from the North was elected president, he appointed Alhaji Yar’adua (no 
relation), from the North, and in fact from the same state as well. In most cases, “these 
changeovers are accompanied by promises of a full investigation of NNPC’s past 
dealings” (Thurber et al., 2010). However, such declarations are usually a ruse to disguise 
a shuffling of patronage networks in response to a new president (Thurber et al., 2010). 
Furthermore, at the staff level, employment is also commonly found to be granted based 
on connections. However, the level of jobs at the staff level did decrease down to 
approximately 9 000 by 2007 from an excessive amount of 17 000 in 2003 (Thurber et 
al., 2010). 
All in all, granting employment on the basis of patronage usually comes with a high risk 
of inefficiency as those hired for these purposes usually lack the required level of skills, 
and are motivated by the opportunity to accumulate rents rather than perform efficiently. 
7.1.2 Patronage and corruption at the operations level 
 
Turning to the dispensation of patronage at the operations level, the main activities within 
the sector which carry the greatest opportunity for corruption and the delivery of 
patronage, include i) the awarding of licenses, ii) the awarding of oil service contracts iii) 
the awarding of oil export (lifting) contracts and iv) the awarding of import permits for 
the importation of refined products; all of which are “supported” by a structure of 
bureaucracy, bottlenecks, and inefficiencies (Gillies, 2009). 
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7.1.2.1 Upstream sector 
 
7.1.2.1.1 Awarding of licenses 
First, regarding the nucleus of the oil industry, which is the upstream sector, the awarding 
of licenses, which allow for the exploration and production of oil, is highly susceptible to 
corruption. This is because these awards are granted at the discretion of the Minister of 
Petroleum, who possesses full control over the allocation of such licenses. With no 
formal oversight mechanism to ensure the legitimacy of his decision-making, he is 
essentially free to perform the unchecked awarding of these licenses based on patronage.   
There has been evidence of corruption, especially during periods of military rule, during 
which oil blocks were granted to top military officers and their close connections (Gillies, 
2009).  Though in 1999, President Obasanjo’s administration made efforts to improve the 
transparency and competitiveness of the process by making information about the 
available blocks, the selection criteria, and the bids received, publically accessible, 
subsequent investigations revealed that misconduct continued to occur.  
 
A common form of corruption that occurs in this area of activities is the inconsistent 
application of qualification standards in bid rounds; to the benefit of particular 
companies. Furthermore, at times, rights of first refusal are granted to companies that 
promise to make power sector investments. However, often, many of those that receive 
such rights, lack the capacity to undertake such endeavours, and fail to deliver the 
promised investments (Gillies, 2009).  
 
An example, which exemplifies the brazenness afforded by oil ministers in the past as a 
result of their discretionary powers, is when, in 1998, the then Minster of Petroleum, Dan 
Etete, awarded an Oil Prospecting License to Malibu Oil and Gas, a company in which he 






7.1.2.2 Downstream Sector 
Further downstream in the sector, there is also ample opportunity for corruption. 
However; in this case, it is largely under the management of NNPC. NNPC has a 
complex bureaucracy and excessive red tape and therefore it is naturally replete with 
opportunities for discretionary favours at the many approval stages that plague all of its 
processes. Hence, “each approval stage represent [s] a transaction that can benefit a 
gatekeeper or his network of associates” (Thurber et al., 2010). Thus, due to the 
magnitude of corruption risks found within the sphere of NNPC’s activities, a more 
detailed discussion of NNPC activities will follow.  
7.1.2.2.1 Awarding of oil service contracts  
With regards to patronage, the area of contracting offers bountiful opportunities for 
benefits to be streamlined to those well connected with the NNPC employee associated 
with a given transaction (Thurber et al., 2010). For example, in the oil sector, it is 
common for numerous large-scale contracts to be awarded, largely to oil service 
companies, and in principle; it is the duty of the operator to award contracts. However, in 
Joint Ventures, NNPC approves contracts that are worth over US $1 million, and in 
Production Sharing Contracts, the National Petroleum Investment Management Services 
(NAPIMSs) approves those over US$250 000. These thresholds for the values of 
contracts, above which NNPC and its subsidiary, NAPIMS, intervene, are extremely low 
thresholds, considering the fact that the value of most contracts is usually above those 
values, and in the rest of the industry the thresholds are usually higher. Thus, the 
discretionary nature of the process, together with the extra rounds of approval created by 
these low thresholds increase the stages at which bribes can be made.  This allows room 
for government officials, through NNPC and its subsidiary, to wield an excessive amount 
of control in the awarding of contract transactions. They can, therefore, exercise bias in 
favour of companies in which they have a financial stake, or companies of their allies; 
favours in return for which they receive political favours or an advantage in other 
business deals (Gillies, 2009).  
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An example of NNPC’s patronage driven decisions made in the awarding of such 
contracts involves PPP Fluid Mechanics Limited (PPPFM) and Ocean Marine Securities 
(OMS).  Reportedly, PPPFM was handpicked in a secret “bid” to receive a lucrative 
contract, which had not been advertised, to transport crude oil from drilling terminals to 
refineries by ship. The original owners at that time appeared to be fronts because eight 
months later, PPPFM was owned by Idahosa and Tunde, the latter of which is a, 
“longstanding ally” of former President, Goodluck Jonathan. OMS, also owned by 
Idahosa and Tunde, also received a contract, under the same suspicious conditions to 
provide security for the PPPFM ships transporting the crude oil. Nonetheless, the most 
inappropriate aspect of this deal was the fact that it involved the transportation of the oil 
via ship, which cost several times the cost of transporting the oil via NNPC’s subsidiary, 
the Pipelines and Product Marketing Company’s pipelines. NNPC’s financial loss from 
this has been extremely substantial since the price it paid to transport crude via ship was 
₦1 131.74 per barrel, (equivalent to $5.68) whereas the price it could have paid to 
transport crude through PPMC’s pipelines, would have been ₦5.97 (Ogala, 2015).  
 
7.1.2.2.2 Awarding of term/lifting contracts  
The awarding of contracts, which allow the export of crude oil, is also highly 
discretionary and the beneficiaries of these contracts, in particular, are given the 
opportunity to make extremely high profits through arbitrage.  This is due to the fact that 
these transactions involve official prices, as opposed to prices determined by the market. 
Therefore, the gap between these prices offers opportunities for large profits and 
incentivises corruption (Thurber et al., 2010).  
 
This brings the discussion to that of the most critical activity with regard to the risk of 
corruption: NNPC oil sales. NNPC sells almost half of the total amount of oil produced 
by Nigeria, with sales of approximately one million barrels of oil a day, making the 
biggest contribution, which was estimated to be $41 billion in 2013, to government 
revenues (Sayne et al., 2015). The oil sold by NNPC can be divided into two main 
categories: oil that gets sold for export and oil that is sold to feed local refineries that 
serve the local market. 
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Crude oil sold for export 
Regarding the former, on behalf of the government, NNPCs Crude Oil Marketing 
Division (COMD) sells most of its share of crude oil production for export at an official 
selling price (OSP) which it sets monthly. These sales are mostly to international traders, 
but also to local trading companies, foreign refineries, NNPC oil trading companies, 
other countries and briefcase companies (Sayne et al., 2015). The proceeds of these 
transactions accrue to the Federation of Nigeria’s account in the Central Bank of Nigeria 
(Thurber et al., 2010). 
 
These export sale agreements are called term or lifting contracts (“lifting” referring to the 
act of “loading oil onto a ship at an export terminal”) (Sayne et al., 2015) and holders of 
these contracts are allocated a set amount of oil from the government’s share of oil that 
they can purchase and lift, which usually ranges between 10 000 and 60 000 barrels a day 
(Sayne et al., 2015).  
 
The most simple transactions involve NNPC selling to a trader who sells to a buyer in the 
global market, which can include “another trader, or a refining or oil storage company” 
(Sayne et al., 2015). 
 
NNPC ➞ trader  ➞ global market   
However, when NNPC sells to an intermediary with more limited capacities such a 
briefcase company, that company then, “re-sells to a trading house that has the financial 
and operational wherewithal to actually lift and sell the crude” to a buyer in the global 
market” (Sayne et al., 2015). 
NNPC  ➞  briefcase company  ➞  trader  ➞  global market  
As with the abuse of power in other areas, the lack of transparency in the award 
procedures creates opportunities for corruption and patronage. Evidence of this is that the 
advertised award criteria for term contracts, which include, among others, minimum 
requirements of turnover and local content such as labour, is not applied consistently. 
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This is undoubtedly to benefit politically connected individuals’ companies, which by 
managing to attain a term contract, are placed in an extremely profitable position; more 
so if they are granted pricing terms that are especially favourable. As pointed out 
previously, such individuals profit from the difference between the OSP at which they 
buy crude oil and the higher World Price of crude oil, at which they sell it for when 
exporting (Thurber et al., 2010).  
 
The risk for the delivery of patronage through these contracts is especially apparent when 
contracts are given to briefcase companies. These are small companies that generally 
resell the crude to more experienced intermediary trading companies with the financial 
and operational capacity to lift and sell crude oil on to end users such as refineries (Sayne 
et al., 2015). Evidence of this form of patronage is indicated by the fact that, in 2012, 50 
term contracts were awarded, and of those that received these awards only around 12 – 20 
of them were capable of financing the shipping and selling of their own cargoes (Sayne et 
al., 2015).  
 
It is not clear that NNPC receives any commercial value from its dealings with briefcase 
companies. In fact, it is rather the briefcase companies that seem to benefit from these 
contracts, as, without much effort, they are able to capture margins from oil sales, which 
often fell within the range of $0.25 - $0.40 per barrel in 2013 (Katsouris and Sayne, 
2013; Petroleum Revenue Special Task Force [PRSTF], 2012). They thereby diminish 
the estimated margins of, “ $100 000 - $400 000” that should be accruing to NNPC per 
cargo made by traders” (PRSTF, 2012). Hence, the main purpose of such companies 
winning contracts seems to be the distribution of oil rents. This was more blatantly 
apparent before the 2000s, when generally, these companies had minimal capacities, 
often without offices or full-time staff. However, despite their limited capabilities, they 
still managed to enter into contracts with big traders who, “financed, lifted and sold 
whatever oil the briefcase compan[ies] got from NNPC, in exchange for a fixed per-
barrel commissions” (Sayne et al., 2015). This meant the briefcase companies were 
guaranteed payment regardless of the sales performance of the trader. It is for these 
reasons that more and more briefcase companies came to be used as fronts by some 
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“politically exposed persons” (Sayne et al., 2015). To elaborate, it is common for 
briefcase companies to be owned by one or more private individuals who pose as a front 
for politicians in office and power brokers, with whom the briefcase company covertly 
splits its profit margins (Sayne et al., 2015). According to an expert in resource 
governance, briefcase entities proliferated under former President Goodluck Jonathan’s 
administration as a patronage system, and, “by 2014, Nigeria’s briefcase system was 
responsible for $40 billion worth of oil contracts, using the Brent crude prices at the 
time” (African Network of Centers for Investigative Reporting [ANCIR], n.d.). 
Moreover, “a growing number appear[ed] to be businessmen and elites from the Niger 
Delta” (Katsouris and Sayne, 2013), which is no surpise given that Jonathan himself is a 
member of the Niger Delta elite, originating from the Bayelsa State in the South west 
area of Nigeria. 
Some industry members support the award of contracts to these less experienced Nigerian 
Companies, on the basis that it would be good to, “boost home-grown trading skill and 
grown local content in the Nigerian crude trading business” (Sayne et al., 2015). 
However, this argument is moot in the many cases in which the briefcase company, 
neglects making efforts to enhance indigenisation or market growth, but instead focuses 
on channelling wealth from everyday civilians to elites (Sayne et al., 2015).  
Another avenue through which potential term contract holders influence or guarantee 
their award of a contract is through bribes. In fact, some industry members have admitted 
that bribe payments remain an integral part of the business and that it is common for 
companies to bribe an official or someone who is well connected, politically (usually 
referred to as a sponsor), in exchange for being awarded an allocation of crude (Sayne et 
al., 2015). In these cases, the “sponsor” who can sometimes be a member of, “foreign, 
political elites, including government officials” is not necessarily a secret owner of the 
paying company (Sayne et al., 2015).  
There is also the issue concerning the price at which NNPC sells oil to intermediaries. As 
mentioned, the profits that intermediaries make arise from the difference between the 
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OSP and world prices. By NNPC not selling directly to global buyers, it loses out on 
capturing the margin that intermediaries do. Sayne et al (2015) argue that this begs the 
question as to how and why NNPC prices crude oil at lower levels, and whether this is 
purposefully done to, “allow for payments to intermediaries or their hidden owners” 
(Sayne et al., 2015). According to the World Bank, during the Abacha administration, 
NNPC regularly lowered prices, which meant that middlemen could earn higher 
commissions. What is interesting, as Sayne et al (2015) note, is that, “buyers agree to 
cargoes NNPC offers them before knowing the price differential, suggesting they are 
fairly confident of obtaining wide enough margins” (Sayne et al, 2015). If not, they 
would likely not buy the cargo, if the payment for the “politically exposed person” could 
not be covered (Sayne et al., 2015). Although there is no proof to support this, given that 
Nigeria is an LAO, this may be plausible.  The ruling coalition could be transferring these 
oil rents with the aim of dispersing rents to a wide enough web of elites, which would be 
viewed as necessary to keep the LAO stable.  
 
Furthermore, for some term contract holders, their insatiable desire to accumulate rents 
drives them to perform more corrupt activities. For example, some of the term contract 
holders who sell to intermediaries, purposefully, “sell their cargos at losses to 
intermediary companies (in which they have an ownership interest) that are located in 
offshore jurisdictions” (Sayne et al., 2015). This is done in order to be able to record a 
loss in their books and avoid income tax. However, they then re-sell the oil at a profit 
through their intermediaries, thereby, making super large profits. 
 
Crude oil sold for refined products  
Regarding the remaining share of the government’s crude oil, which was about 35% in 
2013, this gets sold to NNPC’s subsidiary, the Pipeline and Products Marketing Company 
(PPMC) (Sayne et al., 2015). The amount sold to PPMC, is referred to as the “domestic 
crude allocation” and is supposed to be processed by Nigeria’s four state-owned 
refineries that should supply the domestic market (EIA, 2015). Essentially the purpose of 
the DCA is to provide fuel to the domestic market. The revenue generated through the 
sale of the petroleum products from the refineries is meant to be used to pay NNPC for 
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the crude that PPMC received, and subsequently paid to the government (Sayne et al., 
2015). However, since these refineries operate at around 30% of their full capacity, and 
generally only meet at most 15% of the local demand (Thurber et al., 2010) about 75% of 
the domestic crude allocation is generally sold by NNPC for export, “to some of its term 
customers, on terms that are similar to regular export sales” (Sayne et al., 2015). 
Therefore, PPMC also pays NNPC for the crude with proceeds that it gets from the sales 
of crude for export (Sayne et al., 2015).  
7.1.2.2.3 Awarding of import permits 
Regarding how Nigeria attempts to serve its domestic demand for refined products, 
which its refineries fail to do, Nigeria has employed multiple means of obtaining and 
supplying fuel. The four methods that have been used involve:  
1) NNPC refining crude oil at its local refineries and selling most of the fuel to private
fuel marketing companies, with a smaller share being sold, through NNPC Retail Ltd.,
which is its network of retail filling stations (Sayne et al., 2015).
2) NNPC, through PPMC, importing via the open account import system, which is a
mechanism in which refined products are imported and delivered to PPMC by traders in
return for cash. PPMC then sells these products to fuel retailers, among other types of
intermediary companies (Sayne et al., 2015).
3) The Petroleum Product Pricing and Regulatory Authority (PPPRA) granting import
permits, without the involvement of NNPC, to private marketers who import petroleum
products and sell them to a various wholesale and retail buyers (Sayne et al., 2015).
4) NNPC importing refined products through a cashless transaction, called a swap deal,
which involves bartering some of the unrefined domestic crude oil allocation for
petroleum products (Sayne et al., 2015). Note, after the open account system was phased
out in 2011, due to PPMC’s inability to pay fuel importers, an increasing amount of this
unrefined domestic crude allocation has been set aside for oil-for-product swap deals. In
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fact, by 2011, 79 million barrels of crude, which was almost half of the DCA, and worth 
around $9 billion, was allocated to swaps (Sayne et al., 2015). 
 
Of these, the third and fourth methods are most relevant to the discussion of patronage 
and economic loss with regard to import permits.  
 
Regarding PPPRA private marketers, past instances have shown that being granted such 
permits puts them in a prime position for corruption due to a lack of checks and balances. 
The corruption risk stems from the fact that these companies are entitled to subsidy 
payments from the Petroleum Support Fund (PSF), which reimburses them for the 
difference between the price at which they imported fuel and the subsidised price at 
which they are obligated to sell the fuel for in Nigeria (Sayne et al., 2015). This 
entitlement has incentivised some players to cheat the system. One way this has been 
achieved is by marketers obtaining petroleum products at subsidised prices from NNPC, 
and then forging documents, which present the fuel as imported petroleum products 
(Gillies, 2009). This allows them to make a claim to the PSF and benefit from a 
fraudulent subsidy payment. According to news reports, one of the culprits of this 
fraudulent activity is Ontario oil and gas, which was prosecuted for reportedly being the 
culprit of a ₦1.9 billion subsidy fraud (Ezeamalu, 2013a).  
 
In terms of the swap deals, there are two types of swaps agreements, which NNPC enters 
into. One, referred to as a Crude-Oil-for-Refined-Product Exchange Agreement (RPEA), 
involves the trader receiving an allocation of crude, in return for which the trader takes on 
the responsibility of importing refined products that have an equivalent monetary value to 
the crude they received, “minus certain agreed fees and expenses, the value of which the 
trader keeps” (Sayne et al., 2015). The second type, known as an Offshore Processing 
Agreement (OPA), has terms whereby a refiner or trading company lifts a specific 
amount of crude, refines it abroad and returns the resultant products to NNPC, which 
should be in accordance with the expected yields of diesel, kerosene and gasoline 
outlined in the contract. 
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Similar to the case of other activities, the awarding of RPEAs and OPAs is opaque in 
nature, with a lack of oversight. Concerning the contract winners for these swaps deals, 
there is also evidence of patronage, as in the past some have lacked basic trading 
capabilities, such as being able to, “market their own crude and source their own products 
directly from refiners” (Sayne et al., 2015). For example, in the case of RPEAs being 
awarded to Aiteo and Ontari in 2011, these companies had had low profiles in the 
industry before being awarded their contracts that year, which in fact was a first time 
experience for both of them (Sayne et al., 2015). These discrepancies are indications that 
their contracts may have been awarded as an extension of patronage.  
The main loss to NNPC of such practices arises when the contract terms agreed on are 
excessively favourable for the lifters. An example of this according to Sayne et al (2015) 
is in the OPA deals NNPC had with Aiteo and SIR-Sahara, whereby the favourable terms 
of three provisions in the two contracts, together, were estimated to have resulted in a 
loss to NNPC of $381 million in one year. One of these provisions was in the refining 
fuel loss allowance. This allowance relates to the fact that when oil is refined, the amount 
of product that results is less than what was used, because of chemical conversion. In this 
case, although the average loss of refining is usually 8% for these companies, the 
contracts provided an allowance of 10.5%. Thus, according to Sayne et al (2015) NNPC 
lost out on an extra 70095MT of products that it could have received had it used the more 
realistic 8% allowance, and this resulted in a loss of $70 211 896 in 2011.    
On the whole, as part of an attempt to keep the LAO stable, various bodies in the oil 
sector, though predominantly the NNPC, by virtue of its inefficient, bureaucratic nature 
and incompetence as an oil company and regulator, administer patronage to elites from 
the upstream to the downstream sector. The economic impact of this is that much of the 
revenues that could be earned by the state and put to use productively get wasted in return 
for political favours, which bear no fruit to the nation. The subsidy fraud which 
reportedly cost Nigeria $6.8 billion between 2009 and 2011 (“Factbox: Nigeria…”, 
2012), as well as the revenues lost through extremely favourable terms in lifting 
contracts, service contracts and swap deals which benefit the contracts holders, among 
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other factors, have culminated in NNPC’s failure to maximise long-term oil revenues, 




Essentially, changes in rent distribution have had an effect on the economy in a number 
of different ways. With regard to formal rent distribution system, through the revenue 
allocation formula, state creation and other government actions, the effect has been 
indirect as it was predominantly channelled through conflict and political instability. In 
contrast, with regard to the less formal rent distribution through patronage and corruption 
at the organisational level in the oil industry, oil’s impact on rent distribution has had 
more of a direct impact on the economy. 
 
It appears that though agriculture was the mainstay of the economy prior to 
independence, as oil gained prominence in terms of its revenue generation, agriculture’s 
role in the economy declined and the revenue allocation formula underwent increasingly 
drastic changes in order to allow the ruling elites and their close ties to have more access 
to oil revenues. In fact, what transpired was that, “with the ascendance of oil (found 
mainly in the homelands of the ethnic minorities) as the pivot of the nation’s economy, 
the interest of derivation on the part of those who wield state power, faded, given that it 
would now promote the interests of minorities who do not hold state power” (Ebienfa and 
Kumokuo, 2012).  
At the same time, as oil’s role in the economy rose, the centralization of revenues at the 
federal centre increased. This, together with the proliferation of new states, left the 
resulting states unable to operate independently of the federal government, of which they 
eventually became mere appendages. Essentially, over the course of time, the revenue 
allocation formula and the number of states were altered in favour of the major ethnic 
groups in the federal government at the expense of the minority ethnic groups (Ebienfa 
and Kumokuo, 2012). 
The result was that, a series of political crises occurred which resulted in a civil war and 
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numerous coups. While the war resulted from sentiments of exploitation, and 
marginalisation along ethnic lines, the numerous changes in governments, specifically the 
coups, were more of a result of rivalry within the predominantly northern military, than 
that of inter-regional civilian ethnic conflicts. This is because due to the centralisation of 
the bulk of Nigeria’s revenues at the federal level, the state offered unfettered access to 
oil rents, which fuelled competition among different factions of the military for 
government posts and especially leadership (Omeje, 2006).  
The ultimate impact on the economy is that economic growth has been stunted. This is in 
part due the fact that violent conflict interrupts oil production and productivity in the rest 
of the economy, but also because political instability deters investment as the notion of 
property rights is undermined, and uncertainty in the economy is high.  
Furthermore, patronage in the oil sector results in the wasteful leakage of revenues from 
the state, away from nationally productive uses. Instead, the revenues get used 
unproductively to the benefit of a few well-connected rent seekers as opposed to the 
nation as a whole. 
Overall, with the lack of an institutional architecture that limits the power of the federal 
government, and that effectively enforces checks and balances in the oil sector, Nigeria’s 
experience of economic underperformance will remain perpetual in nature. Although 
steps in the right direction have been made with the maintenance of democratic civilian 
rule since 1999, and an improvement in the transparency of the oil sector, Nigeria has a 
long way to go before its institutional environment will be formidable against the 
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